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INTRODUCTION
The increasing phenomenon of U.S. extraterritoriality, or exten-
sion of federal law to activity outside U.S. borders,' embroils a
'The noun "extraterritoriality" requires elaboration. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Ter-
ritory, Territoriality, and the Resolution of Jurisdictional Conflict, 57 Am. J. Comp. L.
631, 635 (2009) ("'Territoriality' and 'extraterritoriality'.. . are legal constructs. They
are claims of authority, or of resistance to authority, that are made by particular ac-
tors with particular substantive interests to promote."). By its use, I mean that at least
one relevant act occurs outside the United States and that the United States seeks to
regulate the act abroad. See Lea Brilmayer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritori-
ality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1217, 1218 & n.3 (1992).
To this extent, and as will become apparent throughout this Article, I would view a
claim of what conventionally is referred to by international lawyers as "objective terri-
toriality" over activity abroad as a claim to regulate extraterritorially. See Buxbaum, supra,
at 635.
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complex tangle of multifaceted and often overlapping legal doc-
trines. The messiness of the law in this area is generating difficult
and novel questions for courts given the deepening interconnect-
edness of world markets, the push to better regulate harmful
transnational conduct like cybercrime and child sex tourism,' and
growing efforts by plaintiffs to recover in U.S. courts for a variety
of alleged harms abroad ranging from securities fraud5 to human
rights abuses.6
Academic debate has raged for decades over whether, and how,
courts should construe statutes silent on geographic scope to reach
extraterritorially.7 Different scholars have proposed different ap-
proaches, with the only common point of agreement seeming to be
that judicial resolution of this question is badly fragmented and
confused'-an assessment with which the Supreme Court evidently
now agrees.
9
2 See Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality's Fifth Business, 61 Vand.
L. Rev. 1455, 1478 & n.124 (2008).
'For instance, the United States has prosecuted foreign hackers operating abroad
who have targeted computer systems in the United States. See, e.g., United States v.
Ivanov, 175 F. Supp. 2d 367, 367-70 (D. Conn. 2001); see also Computer Fraud and
Abuse Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).
'For an unprecedented and aggressively extraterritorial law over this type of conduct
abroad, see the Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Chil-
dren Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2006). For an evaluation of the
constitutionality of this law under the Foreign Commerce Clause, see Anthony J. Colan-
gelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 Va. L. Rev. 949,991-1003 (2010).
, See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010).
6 The most prominent and controversial statute generating these kinds of suits is the
Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.").
'See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 Minn. L. Rev. 110, 113-21 (2010) (sur-
veying different scholarly approaches and proposing new approach).
Id. at 129; see also Curtis A. Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights in an
Age of Globalism, 37 Va. J. Int'l L. 505, 507 (1997); William S. Dodge, Understanding
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 85, 89-90 (1998);
John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 Am. J. Int'l L. 351,
351-52, 396 (2010); Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law Af-
ter the Insurance Antitrust Case: A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89
Am. J. Int'l L. 750, 752 (1995); Parrish, supra note 2, at 1459; Jonathan Turley, "When
in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,
84 Nw. U. L. Rev. 598, 599-601 (1990).
9 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2878 (condemning "a collection of tests for divining
what Congress would have wanted, complex in formulation and unpredictable in ap-
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More recently, a second scholarly and judicial trend has also begun
to take shape. With the proliferation of laws seeking aggressively to
regulate foreign conduct,1" some commentators and courts have start-
ed to engage more foundational questions about the existence and
contours of constitutional limits on Congress's power to legislate ex-
traterritorially in the first place1 and the potential for individual
rights violations under the Due Process Clause resulting from arbi-
trary or unfair applications of U.S. law abroad." In short, two main
lines of extraterritoriality analysis have emerged: one, long discussed
but still hotly debated, involves how to construe statutes silent on
geographic scope; the other, gaining scholarly momentum and bub-
bling up in lower courts, involves the constitutionality of unprece-
dented and ambitious projections of U.S. law abroad.
This Article's main objective is to bring these related, but until
now analytically isolated, strands of thinking together to create a
conceptually coherent, methodologically clean, and normatively ap-
pealing framework regarding extraterritoriality. My basic thesis is
that the sources of Congress's lawmaking power can and should in-
form both the statutory construction and due process analyses. I ar-
gue that this unified approach trims away doctrinal redundancy and
confusion, supplies courts with an intuitive and cogent blueprint for
extraterritoriality issues, and not least, produces sound results.
Broadly framed, extraterritoriality cases raise three types of issues:
(1) What is the source of Congress's power to legislate extraterritori-
ally? (2) If a statute is silent on geographic scope, should it be con-
strued extraterritorially? (3) And does the extraterritorial application
plication"). It remains to be seen whether the Court's new transactional test regarding
the statute at issue in Morrison, Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934, clears away this complexity and unpredictability.
,0 See, e.g., Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Chil-
dren Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2006) (criminalizing under
U.S. law sexual abuse of a minor abroad).
"See Colangelo, supra note 4, at 951-58; Eugene Kontorovich, Beyond the Article
I Horizon: Congress's Enumerated Powers and Universal Jurisdiction over Drug
Crimes, 93 Minn. L. Rev. 1191, 1219-23 (2009) [hereinafter Kontorovich, Article I
Horizon]; Eugene Kontorovich, The "Define and Punish" Clause and the Limits of
Universal Jurisdiction, 103 Nw. U. L. Rev. 149, 150-53 (2009) [hereinafter Kon-
torovich, "Define and Punish" Clause].
2 See Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 1, at 1223; Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitu-
tional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: Terrorism and the Intersection of Na-
tional and International Law, 48 Harv. Int'l L.J. 121, 158-62 (2007).
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of U.S. law violate due process? The unified approach uses the an-
swer to the first inquiry to help resolve the other two. In brief, some
sources of legislative authority grant Congress power to implement
international law or legal obligations. 3 Other sources do not require
a predicate international norm; Congress simply may enact national
law and project it abroad.14 The unified approach holds that when
Congress enacts a statute silent on geographic scope designed to im-
plement international substantive law, courts should construe that
statute in line with international jurisdictional law, including atten-
dant principles of extraterritorial jurisdiction. That is to say, when
Congress implements international law, courts should presume Con-
gress intended to implement all of international law-including in-
ternational jurisdictional law, which may permit, encourage, or even
obligate extraterritoriality. In this respect, the relevant tool of statu-
tory construction is the Charming Betsy canon, under which courts
construe ambiguous statutes in conformity with international law. 5
This result is superficially at odds with another popular interpre-
tive canon regularly used to construe statutes quiet on geographic
scope-the presumption against extraterritoriality-which presumes
"that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United
States."16 The tension vanishes, however, in light of the presumption's
original motivation: to avoid unintended discord with foreign na-
tions.7 A presumption against extraterritoriality made sense when
the international law of jurisdiction was strongly territorial in nature.
13 Examples include the power to "define and punish ... Offences against the Law
of Nations," U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10, and to effectuate treaties through the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, both of which are discussed infra Part II.
14A key example is the Foreign Commerce Clause. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; see also Hart-
ford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting on
the statutory issue) ("There is no doubt, of course, that Congress possesses legislative
jurisdiction over the acts alleged in this complaint: Congress has broad power under
Article I, § 8, cl. 3, '[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,' and this Court has
repeatedly upheld its power to make laws applicable to persons or activities beyond
our territorial boundaries where United States interests are affected."); Colangelo,
supra note 4, at 952.
"Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
" EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (quoting Foley
Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949)).
" Id. at 248.
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But now that international law embraces and sometimes even re-
quires extraterritorial jurisdiction, the presumption not only is anach-
ronistic, it perversely may achieve precisely what it was designed to
avoid: discord with foreign nations. Suppose Congress enacts a stat-
ute implementing an international customary or treaty-based norm
that carries with it the encouragement or obligation to exercise extra-
territorial jurisdiction. If courts apply the presumption against extra-
territoriality to that statute, it will have accomplished exactly what it
was designed to avoid by blocking fulfillment of U.S. international
responsibilities. 8 Unfortunately, when courts have been faced with
this type of question, they have tended to do just that, sometimes
triggering a swift response by Congress.19
Indeed, the reasons traditionally underwriting the presumption
against extraterritoriality drop out for statutes implementing interna-
tional law. Concerns about extraterritorial applications of U.S. law
conflicting with foreign law inside foreign territory largely evaporate,
since the U.S. law by nature will not conflict with the international
law also operative inside the foreign territory. Moreover, while the
conventional assumption that Congress legislates with only domestic
concerns in mind may make sense for statutes reflecting national val-
ues and preferences," that assumption holds far less intuitive force
when Congress implements international law-which, after all, deals
by definition with foreign nations and shared values and preferences
with those nations. Finally, concerns about courts usurping or intrud-
ing upon sensitive foreign policy decisions by extending U.S. law
abroad21 can be turned upside down when it comes to statutes im-
plementing international law. Here it is the deployment of a thor-
oughly judicial contrivance-the presumption against extraterritori-
ality-that threatens to interfere with U.S. foreign relations by
potentially stunting the ability of the United States to fulfill its inter-
national obligations, not the construction of statutes in line with
" See, e.g., infra notes 256-66 and accompanying text; see also Knox, supra note 8,
at 380 ("[I]nternational norms often do require their parties to fulfill obligations with
respect to places outside their sovereign territory but subject to their jurisdiction.").See infra notes 256-66 and accompanying text.
20 Cf. Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Choice of Law and the Problem of Justice, 41 Law
& Contemp. Probs. 27, 28 (1977) (noting that laws are a reflection of the values and
traditions of the community).
21 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 516.
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those obligations.22 All of this is not to say that potential frictions will
never arise regarding the choice of forum, as opposed to the choice
of law. But that is a separate question, governed by separate jurisdic-
tional principles that directly take into account those frictions when
evaluating whether U.S. courts can or should entertain suits involving
foreign elements.' My argument here relates only to the choice of
law, which by definition is the same everywhere for statutes that im-
plement or apply international law.
By contrast, the reasons traditionally favoring the presumption
against extraterritoriality persist for statutes enacted under legislative
sources authorizing the enactment of purely national law. Extraterri-
torial application of these statutes elevates the risk of discord with
foreign nations resulting from both jurisdictional overreaching and
conflicts with foreign law in foreign territory. Furthermore, extending
these laws abroad defeats the (here quite sensible) assumption that
when Congress passes laws reflecting and advancing national values
and preferences, those laws are directed primarily toward domestic
concerns. And, because of all of these features-the risk of jurisdic-
tional overreach, clashes with foreign law, and applying U.S. national
values and preferences inside other countries-concerns about judi-
cial interference in sensitive foreign policy matters have traction.
A unified approach would affect extraterritoriality cases involving
a range of hot-button issues including, among other things, modem
piracy and terrorism, which are subjects of U.S. laws that implement
international law. The theory's crux that statutes implementing in-
ternational norms ought to be construed differently also holds impli-
cations for jurisdictional statutes, such as the Alien Tort Statute
("ATS")-an ever more polemical law allowing foreigners to recover
in U.S. courts for violations of international law. ' For one quick ex-
22See Knox, supra note 8, at 387.
See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115-16 (1987) (setting
outer limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the international arena); Piper Air-
craft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 & n.6 (1981) (applying the doctrine of forum non
conveniens in the international arena); see also infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text
(discussing adjudicative jurisdiction doctrines in this regard).
24 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). Some scholars have argued that the ATS was enacted
precisely to "remedy an important category of law of nations violations committed by
US citizens against aliens." Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Alien Tort
Statute and the Law of Nations, 78 U. Chi. L. Rev. 445, 446 (2011); see also id. at 2
(concluding that "[r]ead in light of Article III, the common law forms of action appli-
cable to intentional torts against aliens, and the background law of nations principles
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ample discussed below,25 in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the
Supreme Court very recently and very forcefully yanked back to U.S.
borders the principal antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange
Act, which lower courts had been construing extraterritorially for
over four decades.26 On its face, the Court's powerful reinvigoration
of the presumption against extraterritoriality appears to cover other
laws silent on geographic scope, like the ATS, instantly wiping away
an avalanche of high-stakes cases alleging harms outside the United
States. In fact, the Second Circuit already has used Morrison to cut
off at the U.S. border another geographically silent statute, RICO."
Unless one can come up with a principled reason for treating one
context differently than the other, entertaining suits based on foreign
conduct under the ATS appears in open tension with Morrison, and
the ATS is now susceptible to judicial paring-all the way back to
U.S. borders.
The distinguishing principle this Article advances is that, unlike
the Securities Exchange Act, the ATS applies international substan-
tive law, and therefore should also apply international jurisdictional
law. Because international law has evolved to authorize extraterrito-
riality, so too should the ATS. Accordingly, as long as courts apply
international law under the statute (as opposed to, say, uniquely U.S.
federal common-law rules), the ATS's scope should also be con-
strued in conformity with international law, which contemplates ex-
traterritoriality. In this regard, the approach meshes nicely with Mor-
rison's direction that courts may consult statutory "context" in
construing geographic reach.' Here the relevant context is that the
statute authorizes application not of uniquely national law but of in-
ternational law, which applies everywhere and authorizes extraterri-
torial jurisdiction.
Next, the legislative source behind a statute can inform current
due process analyses of federal extraterritoriality. Courts are in
agreement that Fifth Amendment due process shields parties from
"arbitrary or fundamentally unfair" applications of federal law
that informed the statute, the ATS restricted suits to those against US citizens, but
permitted aliens to sue for any intentional tort to their person or property").
25 See infra Subsection III.C.1.
26130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
27 Norex Petroleum v. Access Indus., 631 F.3d 29, 32-33 (2d Cir. 2010).
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
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abroad,29 measured in large part by whether parties reasonably could
have expected the law to govern their conduct when they engaged in
it.' Yet courts have applied federal common-law rules to relation-
ships between foreign corporations acting outside the United States
and have entertained suits by foreign plaintiffs against foreign defen-
dants for conduct taking place entirely abroad." The U.S. govern-
ment similarly has claimed power to prosecute foreigners for terrorist
acts halfway around the world with no overt connection to the
United States.32 How, if at all, do these applications of U.S. law com-
port with due process and, more specifically, defendants' reasonable
expectations?
Under a unified approach, the answer depends on whether the
U.S. law implements an international law to which the defendant was
already subject. If U.S. law does, the defendant is on notice and the
application does not run afoul of due process. Thus, statutes that im-
plement international law constitutionally may reach a wider variety
of situations abroad than statutes that do not.
Because these areas have not previously been united in this way3
and because each area is on its own fairly intricate, Part I provides a
29 See infra note 432 (citing cases from numerous courts of appeal to have considered the
issue).30See, e.g., United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2003); United
States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990); cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985) (noting this concern in the interstate choice of law
context); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13, 318 n.24 (1981) (same).
31 See infra notes 339-42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 436-40 and accompanying text.
" There have been a couple of brief judicial overtures in this general direction. See
United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 195-96 (1820) ("[I1n construing
[statutory scope] we should test each case by a reference to the punishing powers of
the body that enacted it.") (discussed infra Section III.B); see also Sale v. Haitian
Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 206 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Also, John Knox
has advanced a nuanced approach to the statutory construction issue using interna-
tional rules of jurisdiction. Knox's approach focuses on facts or "situations" of cases
and applies irrespective of whether a statute implements international or a purely
domestic law. See Knox, supra note 8, at 358-59. As a result, Knox's approach would
retain a presumption against extraterritoriality for statutes that implement interna-
tional law where a basis of U.S. jurisdiction exists but is not what he refers to as the
"sole or primary" basis. Id. at 353, 358-59. The unified approach, by contrast, focuses
on the nature of the statute and, more fundamentally, the constitutional source of leg-
islative power behind its enactment and whether it implements international law. It
assigns canons of construction to particular statutes on this distinction and denies the
presumption against extraterritoriality for statutes that implement international law.
2011] 1027
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conceptual and doctrinal overview of the approach to orient the
reader. Parts II, III, and IV then break down and illustrate each area
in more depth, demonstrating where and how the unified approach
would apply to a variety of pressing extraterritoriality issues pres-
ently facing courts and litigants.
Before elaborating the approach any further, a word is needed on
scope of argument and methodology. The Article does not attempt
to bring coherence to the law on extraterritoriality by exposing some
latent, heretofore unidentified yet unifying theme in the cases that
makes them all make sense. The case law is so riddled with inconsis-
tencies and exceptions that such an exercise is probably futile and
maybe even counterproductive. To be sure, as noted, the only thing
courts and scholars seem to agree on is that the law in this area is a
mess.' It is therefore not my intention to comprehensively describe
the law as it is. The very fact that the canons are so perforated with
exception and susceptible to inconsistent treatment by courts sug-
gests they do not work as broad rules of general application. The in-
cessant academic struggle and lingering judicial inability to untangle
this area is symptomatic of the canons' defectiveness as across-the-
board interpretive rules for all types of statutes.
In place of this blanket approach, I advance a new way of looking
at extraterritoriality that unifies constitutional and statutory analyses
by using the source of lawmaking power behind a statute to help de-
termine the appropriate interpretive canon for that statute. In this re-
spect, my approach differs from other approaches that generally op-
pose the presumption against extraterritoriality,35 as well as those that
suggest more statute-specific inquiries.36 The former fall prey to the
same problem with a blanket presumption against extraterritoriality,
but in reverse, because they fail to appreciate the continuing validity
of some rationales supporting the presumption, at least with respect
to laws enacted under purely national legislative sources.
As to the few other statute-specific proposals, I naturally agree
that this is generally the best way to view extraterritoriality issues.
See supra note 8.
3 See Turley, supra note 8, at 602-03.
- See Kramer, supra note 8, at 758; Meyer, supra note 7, at 165.
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Recommending my approach, however, and what sets it apart from
other approaches,37 is once again that it grounds itself in the constitu-
tional source behind the statute. This provides a surer and more prin-
cipled look into congressional intent;38 by nature guarantees har-
monization with foreign law, thereby reducing the potential for
international conflicts;39 and for the same reasons, conforms to inter-
See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 8, at 758 (recommending that courts "balance U.S.
and foreign interests on a statute-by-statute basis and read specific limitations into
particular statutes" but providing little guidance on when or how a statute should be
construed to apply extraterritorially other than suggesting that it should vary depend-
ing on the purpose of the statute).
Professor Jeffrey Meyer has proposed a rule of "dual illegality" for statutes silent
on geographic scope. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 165. Under this rule, if the foreign
jurisdiction where the conduct occurred similarly prohibits the conduct and the
United States has a basis to exercise jurisdiction under international law, courts
should interpret the U.S. statute to apply extraterritorially. Id. This rule, while it holds
intuitive appeal, may lead in practice to counter-intuitive results because of its seem-
ing over-inclusiveness-results that appear contrary to congressional intent. For in-
stance, the rule in practice could end up having courts apply extraterritorially U.S.
statutes that seem plainly intended to regulate purely domestic, garden-variety crimes
like carjacking, automobile destruction, drive-by shootings, owning a machine gun,
and even burning the U.S. flag. See Meyer, supra note 7, at 165, app. at 184-86. It also
fails to heed the assumption that Congress generally legislates with domestic concerns
in mind, which the Supreme Court recently and forcefully reaffirmed in Morrison v.
National Austl. Bank. 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877-78 (2010). The unified approach distin-
guishes Morrison and better incorporates congressional intent by permitting extrater-
ritoriality only for crimes whose proscription, definition, and attendant jurisdictional
scope is a matter of international, as opposed to just domestic, concern-a concern
necessarily captured in U.S. laws that implement international law.
39 In this connection, Professor Hannah Buxbaum argues persuasively for what she
calls "transnational regulatory litigation" cases that seek to apply extraterritorially
U.S. domestic regulatory law regarding, inter alia, antitrust, securities, and RICO,
where that U.S. law "reflects an internationally shared norm." Hannah L. Buxbaum,
Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 Va. J. Int'l L. 251, 255, 268, 298 (2006). As
Buxbaum explains, however, "these cases apply domestic economic law," id. at 255;
that is, they "seek[] to apply not international law but domestic regulatory law." Id. at
298. As a result, Buxbaum recommends that to ensure the extraterritorial application
of these domestic laws does not conflict with foreign law, and is not viewed as U.S.
jurisdictional overreaching by other states, will "depend[] on securing the consent of
other states," id. at 257, and she suggests procedural mechanisms to achieve that con-
sent. Id. at 257, 309. By contrast (though obviously in keeping with the theme that
U.S. courts have a role to play in advancing shared values), the unified approach ar-
gues that for U.S. statutes implementing international law, such foreign nation con-
sent has already been established. Unlike with the purely domestic regulatory laws at
issue in transnational regulatory litigation, other states will already have agreed-by
way of either international custom or treaty-to both the norm implemented in the
1030 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:1019
national rules of jurisdiction to avoid discord with foreign nations.
The approach also neatly accommodates calls to curb unilateral ex-
tension of U.S. law and use instead international lawmaking mecha-
nisms" by illuminating how Congress already does, and can do, just
that through sources of legislative authority that apply either interna-
tional treaty or customary law.
Finally, to be clear from the outset, the approach is not meant to
be either surefire or airtight in every situation. My argument is only
that it can supply an untapped resource for guidance where the scope
of statutes is otherwise unclear41 and offers a more coherent mecha-
nism for framing and resolving extraterritoriality issues than the
jumble of disjointed yet overlapping doctrines courts are presently
tasked with untangling. Further recommending the approach is that
while it seeks to re-conceptualize and add coherence to the field, it
does so in ways that are compatible with recent Supreme Court hold-
ings and is therefore of timely and practical utility to litigants and
courts right now contesting and defining the cutting edge of extrater-
ritoriality.
I. A UNIFIED APPROACH TO EXTRATERRITORIALITY:
AN OVERVIEW
The approach begins with a distinction between the types of law-
making powers Congress may use to legislate extraterritorially. One
class of powers can be thought of as "unilateral" in the sense that the
powers do not depend upon foreign-nation consent, either for Con-
42gress to enact law or for how Congress prescribes the law it enacts.
U.S. law and its accompanying jurisdictional rules. For elaboration of this point, see
infra Part I.
40 See Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law from Extraterritoriality, 93
Minn. L. Rev. 815, 869-74 (2009).
41 Congress also may clearly indicate the reach of statutes. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct.
at 2878.
42 While I chose the terms "unilateral" and "multilateral" because I believe them to
be accurate descriptors of what I would like to convey, they are also used in other ar-
eas of law. In particular, their use here in relation to Congress's power to legislate
should be differentiated from their use in the conflicts-of-law sense, where they de-
scribe different choice-of-law methodologies. In that context,
[u]nilateral conflicts theories focus simply on whether the forum's law applies to
the activity in question, without worrying that another forum might also apply
its law. Multilateral conflicts theories, on the other hand, try to resolve conflicts
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Chief among this class is the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations."43 Thus Congress may, on its own, determine that
foreign anticompetitive behavior or securities activity affecting U.S.
markets is prohibited under U.S. law and may regulate that activity
essentially how it chooses-within limits of the U.S. Constitution of
course,45 but without any agreement or consent from foreign nations.
"Multilateral" powers, by contrast, contemplate some degree of
foreign-nation consent for Congress to legislate, which also shapes
the subject matter and content of the law Congress enacts. Included
within this class are the necessary and proper power to effectuate
treaties46 and the power to "define and punish... Offences against
the Law of Nations."47 For example, Congress self-evidently cannot
enact a law implementing an international treaty unless there is a
treaty. And where there is a treaty, any implementing legislation is
shaped by that treaty." Similarly, Congress cannot define and punish
an offense against the law of nations if no offense exists in interna-
tional law. 9 Here, too, the subject matter of the U.S. law is shaped by
the subject matter of the international offense.
The distinction between unilateral and multilateral sources of
power can profitably inform judicial analysis of whether statutes
quiet on geographic scope should be construed extraterritorially and
whether the extraterritorial application of U.S. law violates due
process. I set forth the argument's central structure here, and then fill
it out with more detail and case illustration in the remainder of the
Article.
As indicated, courts presently employ two longstanding canons of
construction to gauge the geographic coverage of U.S. law. One is the
of jurisdiction so that each activity is assigned exclusively to the legislative ju-
risdiction of one state.
William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and Conflict-of-Laws Theory: An Argument for
Judicial Unilateralism, 39 Harv. Int'l L.J. 101, 104 (1998).
13 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
"See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting on the statutory issue); Colangelo, supra note 4, at 952.
" See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
46 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
17 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
48 See infra Subsection II.B.2.
See Colangelo, supra note 12, at 137-42; Kontorovich, Article I Horizon, supra
note 11, at 1219-23.
'0 Kontorovich, Article I Horizon, supra note 11, at 1219-23.
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presumption against extraterritoriality," which the Supreme Court
just reinvigorated energetically and in broad language.52 A crucial
question now facing courts and litigants is whether this revitalized
presumption also cuts off at the U.S. border other laws silent on geo-
graphic reach, including laws that purport to implement international
law. 3 The other canon is taken from Chief Justice Marshall's state-
ment in Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy that "an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains."54 Under the Charming
Betsy canon, the law of nations, or international law, contains juris-
dictional rules that both authorize and limit the extraterritorial reach
of federal statutes ambiguous on geographic sweep."
The unified approach holds that when Congress enacts law under
multilateral sources of legislative authority, the first of these can-
ons-the presumption against extraterritoriality-should not apply.
Rather, the only relevant tool of construction for these statutes is the
Charming Betsy canon. The reason is that Congress's multilateral
powers are predicated upon international law and function largely to
implement that law in U.S. domestic law. Congress may implement a
treaty through the Necessary and Proper Clause 6 or define and pun-
ish an offense against customary international law under the Of-
fences Clause. 7 In either case, there must be some international law
authorizing Congress to act. Yet international law is not comprised of
only substantive rules; it is also jurisdictional-including rules of ex-
traterritorial jurisdiction. 8 My argument is simply that when Con-
5 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
52 See Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2882-83 (2010).
3 See, e.g., Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14-17, Presbyte-
rian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010) (No. 09-1418).
4 Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see also McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372. U.S. 10, 21 (1963).
55 F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004); see also
Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577-78 (1953) (recounting and applying the juris-
dictional principle of "international law by which one sovereign power is bound to
respect the subjects and the rights of all other sovereign powers outside its own terri-
tory").
56See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
" See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
58 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States §§ 402-04
(1987) (setting forth bases and a test for the exercise of jurisdiction under international
law).
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gress implements international law via multilateral power, it should
be presumed to implement all of international law, including the
relevant international law of jurisdiction. Absent some indication to
the contrary, Congress should not be presumed to implement only a
part of the international law governing certain activity, but all of it.
Looking to the sources of lawmaking power behind statutes to de-
termine the appropriate canon of construction makes good doctrinal,
conceptual, and practical sense. The approach also negotiates and, in
fact, nicely harmonizes arguments for and against the presumption
against extraterritoriality. It shows that arguments favoring the pre-
sumption make the most sense when the statute at issue derives from
a unilateral source of domestic legislative authority. But these same
arguments, upon inspection, do not apply with equal force when the
lawmaking power behind a statute is multilateral. And sometimes
they may even favor extraterritoriality.
The presumption's doctrinal origins and motivating rationales re-
veal why. It originated in jurisdictional rules of international law that
were, at the time of the presumption's genesis, strongly territorial. 9
But as critics have observed for some time, the presumption no
longer vindicates these international rules because the rules them-
selves have evolved to embrace extraterritoriality.6' If international
law were the doctrinal anchor for the presumption today, it would be
remarkably anachronistic. On the surface, then, the presumption has
long been unmoored from its original doctrinal foundations.
Yet just because the presumption against extraterritoriality no
longer mirrors international law does not necessarily condemn its
present-day value or function. Perhaps the rationale behind it still has
sway. The reason jurisdictional rules of international law motivated
the presumption in the first place was "to protect against unintended
clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could re-
sult in international discord."61 Surely this rationale might claim con-
tinuing relevance today, the idea being that if U.S. laws were not ap-
plied extraterritorially, they would not overlap with-and thus could
not conflict with-foreign laws, thereby causing international dis-
9 See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909); The Apollon,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362,370-71 (1824); see also infra Section III.A.
" See Bradley, supra note 8, at 517; Dodge, supra note 8, at 113-14; Turley, supra
note 8, at 607, 655, 659.
61 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).
.2011] 1033
1034 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:1019
cord. Whatever the merit of this rationale with respect to statutes en-
acted under unilateral sources of legislative authority, and there may
be merit,62 the rationale cannot support a presumption against extra-
territoriality for statutes enacted under multilateral sources and may
sometimes cut in the opposite direction: namely, in favor of extrater-
ritoriality.
First, the worry about clashes between U.S. and foreign laws is
minimal if not illusory when it comes to statutes enacted under multi-
lateral sources. Because the root prescription embodied in-and in-
deed authorizing-these statutes is an international norm necessarily
agreed to by other nations through either treaty or custom, it also
applies within those nations." The result is a reduction if not an out-
right elimination of potential for true international "clashes" or con-
flicts of laws. In fact, the presumption itself might spur precisely what
it was designed to avoid, since modern international law sometimes
may encourage or even require extraterritorial jurisdiction. Applica-
tion of the presumption therefore could lead to a failure to fulfill cer-
tain international obligations, and this failure could inadvertently
generate international discord. Where international law authorizes
instead of requires extraterritoriality the potential for discord re-
mains reduced because the United States is still enforcing a norm
shared by all.
This is not to say that the approach will lead to all statutes imple-
menting international law automatically being construed extraterrito-
rially in all situations. Under Charming Betsy, application of ambigu-
ous U.S. laws still must comport with jurisdictional "principles of
customary international law," as the Supreme Court has recently ex-
plained, to "avoid unreasonable interference with the sovereign au-
thority of other nations."' The unified approach merely supplies a
more nuanced mechanism for discerning when and how the jurisdic-
tional assertion may generate discord, unlike the blunt hammer of
the presumption against extraterritoriality, which inadvertently may
create such discord by ignoring the modern international law of ju-
risdiction.
62 See infra Section III.A.
63 If U.S. law implements a treaty, this may not be true for nations not party to the
treaty, unless the treaty creates or evidences a customary norm generalizable to all
nations. For elaboration of this point and examples, see infra Section III.C.
' F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164 (2004).
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There may also, of course, be potential frictions associated with
the assertion of adjudicative or judicial jurisdiction by U.S. courts
over suits with little or no U.S. connection. But that is a separate
question. Those frictions arise principally from the choice of forum,
not the choice of law. As to choice of forum, well-known adjudicative
jurisdiction tests take these frictions directly into account. For exam-
ple, due process limits on personal jurisdiction specifically accommo-
date and elevate concerns about "procedural and substantive inter-
ests of other nations.., as well as the Federal Government's interest
in its foreign relations policies" and accordingly require "a careful
inquiry into the reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the
particular case, and an unwillingness to find the serious burdens on
an alien defendant outweighed by minimal interests on the part of
the plaintiff or the forum State."6 And conventional forum non con-
veniens analysis incorporates a variety of public and private factors
that consider, among other things, practical problems and burdens on
foreign litigants associated with trials in a remote forum, as well as
"local interest[s] in having localized controversies decided at home. '
It is important to understand the distinction, long-recognized in both
U.S. and international law, between the law sought to be applied and
the forum applying it.67 The present approach addresses only the
choice of law, which is, by virtue of the source of lawmaking author-
ity when Congress implements international law, the same every-
where.
65 Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115 (1987). In the crimi-
nal context, there is no such thing as extraterritorial adjudicative jurisdiction because
the accused must be physically present at the start of trial. See Crosby v. United
States, 506 U.S. 255, 261-62 (1993). The exercise of personal jurisdiction, therefore, is
generally predicated upon the United States either having custody of the accused al-
ready or some prior consent and cooperation by the foreign nation, usually through
the international legal mechanism of extradition. See, e.g., United States v. Yousef,
327 F.3d 56, 82, 88-90 (2d Cir. 2003) (discussed infra at Subsection III.C.2.a and Part
IV).
Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 & n.6 (1981).
67 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302,317 n.23 (1981) ("The Court has
recognized that examination of a State's contacts may result in divergent conclusions
for jurisdiction and choice-of-law purposes."); see also id. at 321 n.3 (Stevens, J., con-
curring) ("[T]he Court has made it clear over the years that the personal jurisdiction
.and choice-of-law inquiries are not the same."). This distinction is often referred to as
a question of prescriptive (or legislative) jurisdiction versus adjudicative (or judicial)
jurisdiction. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 401 (1987).
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Other rationales supporting the presumption are also unpersuasive
when the source of lawmaking power behind the statute is multilat-
eral. The most notable are the commonsense assumption that Con-
gress legislates with domestic concerns in mind' and the separation
of powers concern that the judiciary is institutionally ill-suited to de-
termine whether and how U.S. law applies extraterritorially because
such determinations involve "difficult and sensitive policy ques-
tions.""
The assumption that Congress generally legislates with only do-
mestic concerns in mind may comport with common sense when
Congress uses unilateral sources of lawmaking power." But it does
not have the same intuitive strength when Congress uses multilateral
sources rooted in international law, which by its nature deals with re-
lations with foreign nations and norms shared with those nations.
Rather, the opposite assumption makes more sense; that is, it makes
more sense to presume that, in translating international law to U.S.
law, Congress intended application of all of international law, includ-
ing attendant jurisdictional rules that contemplate-and may even
obligate-extraterritoriality.
If this is correct, then reading (out) the presumption against extra-
territoriality in this manner tends to turn on its head the separation
of powers argument, at least with respect to statutes enacted under
multilateral sources. If we are truly worried about courts interfering
in U.S. foreign affairs through determinations of "whether and how
m EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991).69Bradley, supra note 8, at 516. In addition, Bradley notes two other rationales: in-
ternational comity and choice-of-law principles. See id. at 513-14. These more or less
coincide with or are captured by the international law rationale discussed in the text,
at least as I have articulated it. The comity rationale is avoidance of clashes with for-
eign law, specifically where U.S. interests may be inferior to foreign interests, and the
operative choice-of-law principle is lex loci delicti, or the law of the place of the act
determines its legality. Id at 515. The comity rationale is essentially a restatement of
the international law concern, albeit with a softer touch since comity is viewed not as
a legal obligation but as a matter of mutual respect among sovereigns to consider each
other's interests. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). The lex loci delicti
principle matches up with the strict territoriality of the old international jurisdiction
rules, and it has similarly fallen largely into desuetude. See Symeon C. Symeonides,
Choice of Law in Cross-Border Torts: Why Plaintiffs Win and Should, 61 Hastings
L.J. 337, 346 (2009).
71 See Dodge, supra note 8, at 117-19. Dodge uses this concern to argue in favor of
extraterritoriality in some instances, on the rationale that "what Congress is primarily
concerned with is preventing harmful effects in the United States." Id. at 118.
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to apply federal legislation to conduct abroad,"71 the solution is not to
place an indiscriminate blanket presumption against extraterritorial-
ity on all federal laws, but rather to inquire into the nature of specific
laws, as derived from the legislative sources behind their enactment,
to determine the proper canon or canons of construction. Under such
an inquiry the construction that, absent evidence to the contrary,
most aligns with political-branch intent and U.S. foreign affairs inter-
ests emerges.
Indeed, without insights gained by looking to the source of the
statute for interpretive guidance, one could easily imagine a situation
in which the two presumptions-both designed to capture congres-
sional intent-run up against each other. For instance, if interna-
tional law provides extraterritorial jurisdiction under Charming
Betsy, and the presumption against extraterritoriality by definition
provides the opposite, the two canons would conflict. How to resolve
such a conflict? This Article suggests that the answer is what initially
motivated both presumptions in the first place: avoiding international
discord, which points toward construing statutes enacted via multi-
lateral sources under Charming Betsy, and away from failing to fulfill
U.S. obligations under that same law through context-blind applica-
tion of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Yet when some
courts have faced this sort of dilemma, they have come out the other
way.72
Before turning to due process, I want to take some room to ad-
dress a potential concern extrapolated from the heated and now
fairly longstanding debate about the status of customary interna-
tional law in U.S. courts.73 Recently, Professors Anthony J. Bellia
, Bradley, supra note 8, at 516.
See infra notes 256-66, 366-91 and accompanying text.
See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 815, 870
(1997); Harold Hongju Koh, Commentary, Is International Law Really State Law?,
111 Harv. L. Rev. 1824, 1825 (1998); Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About
Customary International Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66
Fordham L. Rev. 371, 371-72 (1997). For a nice summary of the main lines of debate,
see Anthony J. Bellia Jr. & Bradford R. Clark, The Federal Common Law of Nations,
109 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2009) (explaining that "[t]he 'modern' position asserts that
federal and state courts should recognize and enforce customary international law as
supreme federal law whether or not the political branches have incorporated it
through constitutional lawmaking processes" and that "[t]he 'revisionist' position, by
contrast, asserts that customary international law is federal law only to the extent that
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and Bradford Clark persuasively articulated a separation of powers
theory to explain the status of certain rules of customary interna-
tional law as federal law.74 According to Bellia and Clark, "The Su-
preme Court has treated certain aspects of the law of nations as a
set of background rules to guide its implementation of the Consti-
tution's allocation of powers."75 They draw upon the now extinct
notion of "perfect rights" in the law of nations, whose violation
"provided just cause for war."76 Included within this list are the
"perfect rights of every other nation to exercise territorial sover-
eignty, conduct diplomatic relations, exercise neutral rights, and
peaceably enjoy liberty."77 On Bellia and Clark's separation of
powers model, "the Court has respected foreign sovereigns' 'per-
fect rights' (and close analogues) as a means of ensuring that any
decision to commit the nation to war would rest exclusively with
the political branches, and not with the judiciary or the states."78 In
short, they argue that "the best reading of Supreme Court prece-
dent dating from the founding to the present" is that the Court has
upheld perfect rights, thereby avoiding international discord unless
the political branches clearly direct otherwise. 9
Toward the end of their article, Bellia and Clark apply this sepa-
ration of powers model to modern extraterritoriality. They argue
that territorial sovereignty was traditionally a perfect right that the
Supreme Court has continued to protect and use as their principal
modern example Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. In Sab-
batino, the Court refused to invalidate the nationalization and ex-
propriation of property by another sovereign, Cuba, within its own
territory where the act arguably violated international law.8 Ac-
cording to Bellia and Clark, "the Court refused to depart from a
the political branches have properly incorporated it; otherwise, it may operate as state
law if a state has incorporated it").
14 Bellia & Clark, supra note 73, at 5.
75 Id.761 Id. at 6.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 5.
79 Id. at 9; see also id. at 76 ("[F]rom the early decades of the Republic and across
changing eras of American legal thought, the Court has continued to enforce what
were traditionally considered perfect rights of sovereign nations (or close analogues)
as a means of upholding key allocation of powers principles.").
80 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
" Id. at 420, 428-29.
[Vol. 97:10191038
2011] Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality 1039
traditional rule of territorial sovereignty (historically regarded as a
perfect right), even though the Court acknowledged that the com-
munity of nations no longer recognized absolute territorial sover-
eignty," and "[i]n effect, the Court held that any decision to aban-
don the traditional perfect rights of recognized foreign sovereigns
would foster resentment and thus should be made by the political
branches rather than the courts or the states."' 2 Indeed, Bellia and
Clark find Sabbatino particularly powerful given that the taking it-
self was claimed to violate international law. Thus, on their read-
ing, the Supreme Court "embrace[d] a traditional rule rooted in
perfect territorial rights and reject[ed] a modern rule curtailing
such rights."83
Since my argument here deals with federally enacted statutes,
the critique about the status of international law in U.S. courts
does not affect the substantive law itself; Congress already has in-
corporated international law into a domestic rule of decision as a
matter of positive lawmaking. But the separation of powers cri-
tique might potentially be extended to questions about the reach of
that statute. Assuming strict territorial jurisdiction is still the de-
fault rule (an assumption to which I shall return below), the argu-
ment would be that by construing geographically silent statutes ex-
traterritorially, courts would be using modern international rules of
jurisdiction to effectively amend statutes in a way that could inter-
fere with the rights of other sovereigns. And that, on a separation
of powers theory, is properly left to the political branches. Hence,
to paraphrase the Supreme Court's recent decision in Morrison,
unless the political branches clearly give the statute extraterritorial
reach, it has none.'
Extending in this way the critique about the status of customary
international law to questions about the reach of already enacted
statutes is logical. But it is an extension, and it comes into tension
with Supreme Court case law in other areas: namely, where the
Court has construed enacted federal laws extraterritorially (as op-
posed to the Court applying unincorporated international law on
its own, as was the issue in Sabbatino). To the extent the separation
Bellia & Clark, supra note 73, at 89.
31d. at 88.
Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
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of powers model claims to describe Supreme Court jurisprudence,
and it does,85 it therefore does not extend to giving extraterritorial
effect to enacted federal laws, which the Court has been doing for
decades in a variety of contexts, even where those laws sharply
conflict with territorial rights of other sovereigns.
After revealing this tension between the separation of powers
model and the more apposite Supreme Court decisions to the pre-
sent argument, that is, decisions construing federal laws, and indi-
cating the limitations of Sabbatino on its own terms,' I demon-
strate that even under a robust presumption against
extraterritoriality like the one the Court recently erected in Morri-
son, courts invariably must confront the possibility of interfering
with territorial rights of other sovereigns any time a case involves
multijurisdictional elements. Indeed, all Morrison does is resurrect
an outdated private international law approach, critiqued and
largely abandoned for its reliance on the formalist fiction that mul-
tijurisdictional claims can be "localized" to a single territory. It is a
rule courts and litigants are now stuck with, but the notion that
courts do not engage in projecting U.S. law extraterritorially simply
by localizing the entire multijurisdictional claim to one territory is
a mirage. The unified approach, I will argue throughout the rest of
this Article using case examples involving piracy, terrorism, and
human rights norms, does a better job of acknowledging the reality
of multijurisdictional claims by using current international law
rules of jurisdiction, at least with respect to U.S. laws that imple-
ment international substantive law. Thus, to choose one of the op-
tions Bellia and Clark propose for translating their nineteenth cen-
tury separation of powers theory to the use of modern
international law, I would adopt a "broad view," whereby courts
could "incorporate elements of modern customary international
law on their own,"" at least when construing the reach of statutes
that themselves are designed by the political branches to imple-
ment international law.
To begin with, the Supreme Court began construing laws silent
on geographic scope extraterritorially in the early part of the last
' See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
86 See infra note 96.87 Bellia & Clark, supra note 73, at 91.
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century-and the Court explicitly used international jurisdictional
rules to support its construction. In United States v. Bowman, for
example, the Court extended a criminal statute silent on geo-
graphic reach to a conspiracy that started on a U.S. ship on the
high seas headed towards Brazil and that continued in the foreign
territory upon arrival.' Acknowledging that Congress had not spe-
cifically directed the statute to apply extraterritorially, the Court
explained:
We have in this case a question of statutory construction. The
necessary locus, when not specially defined, depends upon the
purpose of Congress as evidenced by the description and nature
of the crime and upon the territorial limitations upon the power
and jurisdiction of a government to punish crime under the law
of nations.89
Using this approach, the Court concluded, "Congress has not
thought it necessary to make specific provision in the law that the
locus shall include the high seas and foreign countries, but allows it
to be inferred from the nature of the offense," which was against the
United States thereby authorizing jurisdiction under international
law.' This type of judicial inference, in the absence of a clear con-
gressional command to extend U.S. law inside a foreign sovereign's
territory, is precisely what would be disallowed on a separation of
powers model that preferences foreign territorial sovereignty over
more modern rules of international jurisdiction-rules the Court in
Bowman used to construe the statute extraterritorially.
Even more problematic for a separation of powers model is the
famous Hartford Fire case." There the Supreme Court extended
the Sherman Act-a statute silent on geographic reach-to pro-
hibit entirely foreign conduct by British reinsurers inside Britain in
complete conformity with British law.92 The interference with Brit-
ain's territorial sovereignty is stark, and in fact prompted interven-
tion by the British government as amicus curiae before the Court.
260 U.S. 94, 95-100 (1922).
s9 Id. at 97-98.
Id. at 98 (emphasis added).
,Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993).
"2 Id. at 798-99.
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It is worth quoting the Court's rehearsal and rejection of the Brit-
ish government's arguments:
The London reinsurers contend that applying the [Sherman] Act
to their conduct would conflict significantly with British law, and
the British Government, appearing before us as amicus curiae,
concurs. They assert that Parliament has established a compre-
hensive regulatory regime over the London reinsurance market
and that the conduct alleged here was perfectly consistent with
British law and policy. But this is not to state a conflict. "The fact
that conduct is lawful in the state in which it took place will not,
of itself, bar application of the United States antitrust laws," even
where the foreign state has a strong policy to permit or encour-
age such conduct.93
Whatever one thinks of the Court's understanding of conflicts of
law (which is clearly mistaken in this author's view), the fact re-
mains that this holding is in no way compatible with, and indeed
stands in severe tension with, the idea that the Court has respected
the territorial sovereignty of a foreign nation absent a clear direc-
tion to the contrary from the political branches. Even Justice Scalia
in dissent agreed that the presumption against extraterritoriality
did not block the reach of the Sherman Act to prohibit foreign
conduct that was perfectly-and purposely-legal under the for-
eign sovereign's laws where it occurred, despite the Act's "boiler-
plate language" quiet on geographic coverage.94 Justice Scalia in-
stead would have used the Charming Betsy canon to curtail the
reach of the Act as unreasonable under international law.95 It
should be noted that under a unified approach, the presumption
against extraterritoriality would apply to the Sherman Act as an
exercise of unilateral lawmaking authority (the Commerce Clause)
that, as Hartford Fire highlights, elevates the potential for conflicts
with foreign law and international friction. Thus the unified ap-
3 Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of The United States
§ 415 cmt. j (1987)).
" Id. at 814 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia did suggest that "if the question
were not governed by precedent, it would be worth considering whether that pre-
sumption controls the outcome here," id., perhaps presaging his opinion in Morrison
applying the presumption to the Securities Exchange Act.
Id. at 814-22.
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proach would be more protective of foreign sovereignty than the
Court's current approach in this area.'
On the other hand, the Court's recent reinvigoration of the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality in Morrison appears strongly to
support a separation of powers model that preferences foreign ter-
ritorial sovereignty as a default rule. It requires a "clear indication
of an extraterritorial application" by Congress to overcome the
presumptionS-though the Court also went out of its way to stress
that "we do not say.., that the presumption against extraterritori-
ality is a 'clear statement rule'.... Assuredly context can be con-
sulted as well."98 The Court did not elaborate what this means, but
a unified approach would take the relevant context to be that a
statute implements an international norm to which extraterritorial-
ity attaches. 9
961 suppose one might also argue that the closer situation to Sabbatino would be ex-
tending international law rules like those relating to human rights governing how a
state treats its own nationals to conduct by foreign sovereigns inside their own territo-
ries. But Sabbatino does not reach that far. To be sure, the Court explicitly and care-
fully cabined its holding, observing that "[t]here are few if any issues in international
law today on which opinion seems to be so divided as the limitations on a state's
power to expropriate the property of aliens," 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964), and thus,
rather than laying down or reaffirming an inflexible and all-encompassing rule
in this case, we decide only that the Judicial Branch will not examine the valid-
ity of a taking of property within its own territory by a foreign sovereign gov-
ernment, extant and recognized by this country at the time of suit, in the ab-
sence of a treaty or other unambiguous agreement regarding controlling legal
principles, even if the complaint alleges that the taking violates customary in-
ternational law.
Id.; see also id. at 430 n.34 ("There are, of course, areas of international law in which
consensus as to standards is greater and which do not represent a battleground for
conflicting ideologies. This decision in no way intimates that the courts of this country
are broadly foreclosed from considering questions of international law."). In addition
to treating a far more extensive array of subject matter than government takings, the
overwhelming majority of human rights norms concerning how a state treats its own
nationals inside its own territory are subjects of multilateral "treat[ies] or other un-
ambiguous agreement[s] regarding controlling legal principles," see infra note 283 and
accompanying text; see also Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in
International Law, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1110, 1127-47 (1982), which would then have to
be implemented in U.S. domestic law to fall within the scope of this Article's argu-
ment.
' Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869,2878 (2010).
98 Id. at 2883.
" See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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In any event, a couple of points about Morrison ought to be
made in the separation of powers context because the decision ul-
timately may undermine both respect for foreign sovereigns and
deference to the political branches. The first point is that Morrison
resurrects an old-fashioned and largely abandoned conflict-of-laws
rule to figure out whether the presumption against extraterritorial-
ity even applies to multijurisdictional claims to begin with. After
erecting a robust presumption against extraterritoriality in the first
part of the opinion, the Court turned to the argument that, since
some fraudulent conduct occurred in the United States, application
of the Exchange Act was not extraterritorial but domestic."° The
Court rejected this argument and found that the "focus" of the Ex-
change Act was not the deceptive conduct in the United States but
rather the purchase or sale, which occurred abroad.""1 Here the
Court essentially returned the law to the old vested rights theory in
choice of law, in which an entire multijurisdictional claim was "lo-
calized" based on a single element. Thus, just as the traditional lex
loci delicti rule provides that a multijurisdictional tort occurs en-
tirely where the ultimate injury took effect, even if the conduct
precipitating the injury occurred in another jurisdiction,1 2 the
Court in Morrison held that a violation of the Exchange Act occurs
where the ultimate sale takes place even if the fraudulent conduct
predicating the sale occurred in another jurisdiction. Obviously,
this approach captures formalist themes of predictability and judi-
cial restraint, precisely the themes Morrison touts.' 3
But the idea that localizing a multijurisdictional claim to one ju-
risdiction and then applying that jurisdiction's laws to all elements
of the claim somehow does not implicate extraterritoriality is to
engage in a legal fiction. Indeed, it is a fiction that has been recog-
nized at least since the legal realists attacked the vested rights the-
ory in the middle of the last century. It is enough simply to reverse
either the facts in Morrison or the "focus" of the Exchange Act to
expose it. If, for instance, the sale took place in the United States
and the conduct predicating it occurred abroad, applying the Ex-
"
0 0 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883-86.
101 Id.
'02 See Restatement of Conflict of Laws §§ 377, 378, 384 (1934); see also Ala. Great
S. R.R. Co. v. Carroll, 11 So. 803, 803-07 (Ala. 1893).
" Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881.
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change Act to its statutory "focus" as a matter of territorial juris-
diction would, in reality, clearly constitute applying U.S. law to
conduct inside a foreign territory. Or suppose the Court found the
"focus" of the Exchange Act to be prohibiting fraudulent conduct.
Then, on the facts of Morrison, the Exchange Act would, as a legal
fiction, apply only territorially to U.S. conduct, but in reality could
reach foreign purchases and sales. Not only do concerns about in-
terfering with foreign sovereignty vanish under this focus tech-
nique, the presumption itself is completely absent. One need only
recall an actual example of this kind of technique in the antitrust
context. By focusing on the domestic effects of foreign anticom-
petitive conduct in Hartford Fire, the Supreme Court applied the
Sherman Act inside Britain and, as a result, interfered with the
British government's territorial sovereignty. Yet Hartford Fire's
methodology is in some ways more protective of foreign territorial
sovereignty than Morrison's. At least in Hartford Fire the Court
acknowledged the existence of a presumption against extraterrito-
riality and concluded that it had been overcome. Under Morrison's
approach, the Court could simply avoid the presumption altogether
by localizing the focus of a statute to the domestic element of the
multijurisdictional claim-something courts presumably are now
completely free to do with respect to all sorts of statutes)
°0
This points up another problem for Morrison's approach on a
separation of powers theory: it "marginalizes Congress and then
showcases judicial creativity."'"° At least under the traditional con-
flict-of-laws approach, localization rules were supposed to provide
a neutral a priori framework immune from judicial tampering. But
by giving courts total discretion to discern the "focus" of any given
" See Austen Parrish, Evading Legislative Jurisdiction, 86 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1, 1
(forthcoming 2011). For the dangers of using an "effects test" to overcome the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality, see Parrish, supra note 2, at 1456 ("In the United
States, domestic laws now commonly regulate extraterritorial conduct and transna-
tional litigation has blossomed. No longer limited to the antitrust and commercial
contexts, courts apply all sorts of public and private laws to activity occurring
abroad."). Now all courts need do under Morrison is determine the "focus" is the
domestic effect, and the presumption not only is overcome but becomes totally irrele-
vant.
105 Lea Brilmayer, The New Extraterritoriality: Morrison v. National Australia Bank,
Legislative Supremacy, and the Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of




statute, Morrison "creates a major loophole." 1°6 Professor Lea
Brilmayer explains the irony from a separation of powers perspec-
tive as follows:
Rather than undertaking a thankless (and probably fruitless)
search for indications about what Congress wanted, a court need
only decide that the presumption against extraterritoriality is in-
applicable because the "focus" of the substantive law in question
is something that took place in the United States. The irony is
that the evidentiary standard needed to invoke the loophole-
which no one pretends has been authorized by Congress-is con-
siderably lower than the evidentiary standard needed to satisfy
the presumption-a presumption that supposedly reflects what
Congress wanted. Morrison makes it more difficult than before
to base the result on what Congress wanted and easier than be-
fore to base the decision on undeniably judge-made concepts.07
It is not my objective here to engage in a full-throated critique of
Morrison specifically or the presumption against extraterritoriality
more generally; indeed, I am in favor of a stronger presumption for
laws that implement purely U.S. domestic norms. I simply want to
observe that any time a court decides whether U.S. law applies to a
multijurisdictional claim, that decision invariably implicates extra-
territoriality and triggers potential interference with foreign terri-
torial sovereignty, as the Supreme Court precedent in this area
manifestly shows. Localizing the focus of transnational claims to
U.S. territory may sound nice in theory, but in reality U.S. law ap-
plies extraterritorially to whatever element of the multijurisdic-
tional claim is foreign. This localization rule moreover may unin-
tentionally sideline the political branches even more by giving total
discretion to judges to discern the statutory "focus" and thereby
circumvent the presumption altogether. By virtue of their status as
customary law, modern international jurisdictional rules more real-
istically and transparently capture how and when states exercise ju-
risdiction;'" this Article argues that courts should use these rules to
construe federal statutes enacted by Congress to implement inter-
national substantive law.
'0' Id. at 9.
107 Id.
"8 See infra Part III.
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Lastly, looking to the nature of the lawmaking source behind a
statute helpfully informs reigning Fifth Amendment due process
tests, which hold that extraterritorial applications of U.S. law can be
"neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."'" Briefly stated, if the
source of the statute is multilateral, its extraterritorial application is
far less likely to violate the defendant's due process rights because
the statute is, in effect, enforcing an international law to which the
defendant is already subject in the territory where the conduct oc-
curred. The defendant may still claim that the court's assertion of
personal jurisdiction violates due process if he lacks an adequate
connection to the U.S. forum;... but again, that is a separate ques-
tion.' When it comes to the law being applied, the defendant cannot
claim an unfair lack of notice if U.S. law applies and enforces an in-
ternational norm to which the defendant was already subject.
II. LEGISLATIVE SOURCES
This Part draws a basic and uncultivated distinction between uni-
lateral and multilateral sources of legislative authority. Unilateral
sources grant Congress legislative power independent of foreign
nation agreement, and U.S. laws enacted under these sources need
not reflect preexisting international norms. Multilateral sources, on
the other hand, are rooted in some preexisting international norm
born of international agreement-whether through treaty or cus-
tom-that both authorizes Congress to legislate and shapes the re-
sulting law."2 I do not intend to map here the contours of all Con-
"See, e.g., United States v. Lei Shi, 525 F.3d 709, 724 (9th Cir. 2008); Goldberg v.
UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92,105 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
"' Although the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the issue, it has im-
plied that the Fifth Amendment would apply to assertions of extraterritorial personal
jurisdiction by the federal government in the civil context. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co.
v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113 n.* (1987). Lower courts have applied the Fifth
Amendment in this way. See, e.g., United States v. Swiss Am. Bank, 274 F.3d 610, 618
(1st Cir. 2001) ("[U]nder the Fifth Amendment, a plaintiff need only show that the
defendant has adequate contacts with the United States as a whole, rather than with a
particular state."). Because personal jurisdiction requires physical custody of the ac-
cused in the criminal context, there is no such thing as extraterritorial personal juris-
diction in criminal matters.
'. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
1. While it may not be patently obvious for every single federal statute on the
books, the legislative source is easily detectable for the overwhelming majority of
them, usually on the face of the statutes themselves. For instance, statutes enacted
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gress's powers to legislate abroad. That endeavor alone would re-
quire book-length treatment"3 and is beyond the scope of this pro-
ject. My purpose in this Part is more modest: to sketch this division
with enough substance that it may be used to inform resolution of
the statutory construction and due process issues in Parts III and
IV. The ultimate aim is to construct a doctrinally and normatively
better approach based on these insights.
A. Unilateral Sources
To illustrate unilateral sources of extraterritorial power, we can
use the most prolific: the Foreign Commerce Clause, which grants
Congress power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations."'".4
Congress has used this power to regulate a wide variety of activity
abroad, including child sex tourism,"5 airplane bombing,"6 and
computer fraud,"7 and it arguably undergirds controversial extra-
territorial extensions of U.S. laws governing antitrust and financial
markets like the Sherman Act"' and the Securities Exchange Act."9
The foreign commerce power also appears in numerous statutes
under the Foreign Commerce Clause consistently include the language "in foreign
commerce," see infra notes 115-24 and accompanying text, statutes that implement
customary international law tend to reference "the law of nations," see infra notes
278, 384 and accompanying text, and statutes that implement treaties reflect faithfully
the treaty language, see infra note 369 and accompanying text. Again, the source is
intended only to supply helpful data about the statute's scope. To the extent it is eas-
ier to discern than, say, Congress's specific intent about the geographic scope of the
specific statute at issue-which it will be in the vast majority of cases, as the jurispru-
dence in this area shows-it offers a useful resource.
113 For example, my recent effort to explore just one of Congress's powers resulted
in a ninety-three page article. See Colangelo, supra note 4.
.14 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. Although the Foreign Commerce Clause is used often,
there are potentially other unilateral powers, such as the amorphous foreign affairs
power. See, e.g., United States v. Bin Laden, 92 F. Supp. 2d 189, 220-21 (S.D.N.Y.
2000) (suggesting in dicta that Congress may have power to enact "foreign affairs leg-
islation" over conduct abroad).
.. 18 U.S.C. § 2423 (2006).
116 Id. § 32.
17 Id. § 1030.
,18 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006) ("Every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal."); see also Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Cali-
fornia, 509 U.S. 764, 813-14 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting on the statutory issue).
119 See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206, 208-09 (2d Cir. 1968),
modified on other grounds en banc, 405 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1968).
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quiet on geographic scope that cover more garden-variety of-
fenses 2° like theft from common carriers 12' destruction of motor
vehicles,' 2  drive-by shootings,'123 and carjacking.'2 4 I have identified
and explored elsewhere limits on Congress's power under the
Clause: namely, that the commerce Congress seeks to regulate
must be "with" not only foreign nations but also "with" the United
States-that is, there must be a U.S. nexus; and that Congress has
no more, and in some contexts has less, power to regulate inside
foreign nations than inside the several U.S. states.'26
Critical for present purposes, however, is that for Congress to
legislate there need not be any agreement or consent from other
nations. In this sense, the Foreign Commerce Clause is a unilateral
source of legislative authority. Congress simply may decide on its
own to regulate foreign activity, and then, within constitutional
bounds, regulate it. No foreign-nation consent is needed to trigger
the power.
127
But the Clause is unilateral in another way too. Just as Congress
unilaterally may decide to exercise this power, it unilaterally may
decide what the law it enacts says. No foreign agreement or con-
sent shapes the content of the law Congress enacts. So long as
there is a constitutionally sufficient nexus to the United States,28
Congress may, for instance, apply U.S. antitrust restrictions to be-
havior by foreign entities acting entirely in a foreign nation-even
120 For a fuller listing, see Meyer, supra note 7, app. at 184-86.
,2, 18 U.S.C. § 659 (2006).




1 Id. § 2119.
12 Colangelo, supra note 4.
126 Id. at 954.
,27 While this is true for the vast majority of activity abroad that Congress seeks to
regulate, it may overstate things at the outer reaches of Congress's foreign commerce
power, at least according to the framework I have developed elsewhere. For example,
although under the Interstate Commerce Clause Congress can create comprehensive
national regulatory schemes "among" the several states and, by extension, reach
purely intrastate conduct that threatens to undercut those schemes, Congress has no
power under the Foreign Commerce Clause to create comprehensive international
regulatory schemes "among" foreign nations-but only "with" them. Therefore, to
reach purely intra-national conduct abroad Congress must have created the regula-
tory scheme jointly "with" the foreign nation. Id. at 958.
2Ths can be a complex question. See id. at 986.
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if the law of that foreign nation permits.29 or requires the behavior
prohibited by U.S. law. The potential for jurisdictional overreach
and conflicts of laws should be clear, and will help form the basis of
the statutory construction and due process analyses in the next two
Parts.
B. Multilateral Sources
Multilateral sources are different. For Congress to legislate there
must be a predicate international legal norm that justifies and, in
turn, shapes the legislation. Whether embodied in treaty or cus-
tomary law, this predicate international norm is by nature a prod-
uct of foreign nation agreement. The United States does not make
international law on its own."' The chief multilateral sources for
implementing international law are Congress's powers "[t]o define
and punish... Offences against the Law of Nations"'' and to effec-
tuate treaties via the Necessary and Proper Clause.'32
1. The Offences Clause
Until recently, the Offences Clause had not been the subject of
much scholarly or judicial attention.33 That has changed, especially in
light of headline-grabbing cases involving piracy off the coast of So-
malia."4 Although the contours of Congress's Offences Clause power
have not been precisely defined, it is generally understood that Con-
gress cannot create offenses against the law of nations on its own."'Rather, the Clause authorizes Congress to enforce via domestic law
"' Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993) (noting that con-
duct in London reinsurance market, even if lawful under English law, may be illegal un-
der U.S. antitrust law); see also F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S.
155, 167 (2004) (describing the Court's holding in Hartford Fire).
130 See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66, 120-22 (1825).
"' U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
132 Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
' See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to "Define
and Punish ... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 447,
449 (2000).
134 These cases are discussed infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
135 Colangelo, supra note 12, at 141-42; Kontorovich, Article I Horizon, supra note 11,
at 1219-23; Charles D. Siegal, Deference and Its Dangers: Congress' Power to "De-
fine... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 21 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 865,879 (1988).
[Vol. 97:10191050
Unified Approach to Extraterritoriality
international legal norms. This would seem imperative as a structural
matter. If Congress could unilaterally invent offenses against the law
of nations, anything could fall within its regulatory authority; the Of-
fences Clause could single-handedly demolish the axiom of a gov-
ernment of limited and enumerated powers, not to mention swallow
all other enumerated powers in the Constitution.
The drafting history and precedent support this view. For instance,
James Wilson expressed concern during the drafting that the word
"define" indicated, wrongly, that Congress could discern independ-
ently of other nations the content of the law of nations. Wilson pro-
tested that "[t]o pretend to define the law of nations which depended
on the authority of all the Civilized Nations of the World, would have
a look of arrogance[] that would make us ridiculous."'36 To ease these
concerns, Gouverneur Morris responded that "define" was appropri-
ate because the law of nations was a raw set of norms often needing
legislative refinement for conversion into domestic rules of decision.
Thus Morris explained that "[t]he word define is proper when ap-
plied to offences in this case; the law of nations being often too vague
and deficient to be a rule."'37 These views suggest that "Congress
could not create offenses, but retained only the second-order author-
ity to assign more definitional certainty to those offenses already ex-
isting under the law of nations at the time it legislated."'38
The view that Congress cannot unilaterally determine the law of
nations was also echoed forcefully by Justice Johnson in an oft-
quoted dictum from the era. Rejecting the contention that Congress
could declare murder to be piracy, an offense against the law of na-
tions, and therefore bring that crime within congressional power
when committed by foreigners against foreigners on a foreign ship,
Johnson retorted:
Nor is it any objection to this opinion, that the law declares mur-
der to be piracy. These are things so essentially different in their
nature, that not even the omnipotence of legislative power can
confound or identify them. Had Congress, in this instance, de-
clared piracy to be murder, the absurdity would have been felt
and acknowledged; yet, with a view to the exercise of jurisdic-
'3 2 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 615 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
137 Id.
" Colangelo, supra note 12, at 141.
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tion, it would have been more defensible than the reverse, for, in
one case it would restrict the acknowledged scope of its legiti-
mate powers, in the other extend it. If by calling murder piracy, it
might assert a jurisdiction over that offence committed by a for-
eigner in a foreign vessel, what offence might not be brought
within their power by the same device? '39
On the other hand, when the Supreme Court has upheld U.S. law
pursuant to the Offences Clause, the Court has identified and em-
phasized extant international norms. In United States v. Arjona, the
Court went to lengths to demonstrate that U.S. law prohibiting coun-
terfeiting foreign securities arose from "a duty... which the law of
nations has imposed on [the United States] as part of their interna-
tional obligations."'4 ° The statute, "as a means of performing a duty
which had been cast on the United States by the law of nations," was
therefore a constitutional exercise of the necessary and proper power
to carry out Congress's power under the Clause."' The Court also
made clear that "[wihether the offence as defined is an offence
against the law of nations depends on the thing done, not on any dec-
laration to that effect by Congress."'42 Hence constitutional structure,
history, and precedent all suggest that for Congress to enact law un-
der the Offences Clause there must be a preexisting norm of interna-
tional law. Congress cannot unilaterally invent offenses against the
law of nations but has auxiliary power to assign more specificity
where the international norm is too vague to serve as a domestic rule
of decision.
2. The Necessary and Proper Power to Effectuate Treaties
The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress power to effec-
tuate through domestic law treaties entered into by the Executive
with the advice and consent of the Senate.'43 According to Chief Jus-
tice Marshall's classic test for measuring the constitutionality of laws
passed under the Clause, "[1]et the end be legitimate, let it be within
"' United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 198 (1820).
140 120 U.S. 479, 487 (1887).
141 Id. at 488.
112 Id. (emphasis added).
143 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also Missouri v. Holland, 252
U.S. 416,432 (1920).
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the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate,
which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but
consist with the letter and spirit of the constitution, are constitu-
tional."1" In the context of effectuating treaties, courts have held this
"plainly adapted" test to ensure implementing legislation "bears a ra-
tional relationship to the Convention." '45 But if there is no treaty
Congress obviously cannot effectuate it through implementing legis-
lation. Thus to trigger the power in the first place, foreign-nation
agreement is needed. In this respect, the source of legislative power is
distinctly multilateral.
The treaty also necessarily shapes the implementing legislation. As
to how closely implementing legislation must reflect the treaty, the
Eleventh Circuit recently observed that "the existence of slight vari-
ances between a treaty and its congressional implementing legislation
do not make the enactment unconstitutional; identicality is not re-
quired. Rather... legislation implementing a treaty bears a rational
relationship to that treaty where the legislation tracks the language of
the treaty in all material respects." '146 Applying this standard, the
court found for example that the U.S. Torture Act's use of the term
"under the color of law" did not render the statute an unconstitu-
tional implementation of the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which in-
stead uses the term "in an official capacity."1 7 The court relied on the
report of the Senate Executive Committee charged with evaluating
the Convention, noting that the report "aptly explained that there is
no distinction between the meaning of the phrases 'under the color of
law' and 'in an official capacity."" "8
Accordingly, just as Congress enjoys some prescriptive flexibility
to add definition to customary international law under the Offences
Clause, Congress enjoys "a realm of flexibility... [to] carry out its
delegated responsibilities" to effectuate treaties under the Necessary
and Proper Clause.' 9 Yet both sources fundamentally and necessarily
14 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
145 United States v. Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Bel-
fast, 611 F.3d 783, 800 (11th Cir. 2010).
'46 Belfast, 611 F.3d at 806 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Lue, 134 F.3d at 84).
"' Id. at 808.
148 Id.49Lue. 134 F.3d at 84.
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rely upon international law as a product of agreement between na-
tions, which in turn shapes the resultant U.S. law. The next Part's
statutory construction argument contends that these features tend to
erase or minimize conflicts with foreign laws and ease concerns about
jurisdictional overreaching.
At the risk of moving the cart slightly before the horse, I want to
anticipate briefly the careful reader's objection that because Con-
gress has some flexibility when implementing international law, U.S.
law may not match up exactly with the international norms operative
in foreign nations as a result of their own international legal obliga-
tions. I also do not rule out the possibility that Congress may have
some leeway to push international law in new directions.5 This is
one of the ways international law is formed: such pushes gain accep-
tance and blossom into new rules."' It is not unreasonable to think
the Constitution endows Congress a margin of international lawmak-
ing power in this regard.'52 Again, however, such flexibility cannot be
unbounded or it would destroy the axiom of limited and enumerated
powers and render redundant all other enumerated powers. 3
In any event, there are a number of responses to this concern. First
and foremost, whatever flexibility there is to implement international
law, it belongs to Congress. The next Part deals with courts-
specifically, judicial tools of statutory construction. Concerns about
what Congress does are therefore misplaced. To put the point an-
other way, if the concern is that Congress's flexibility to implement
international law may produce U.S. laws that do not match up ex-
actly with international law, it is irrelevant to the next Part's discus-
sion about statutory construction. Courts face one of two scenarios: If
Congress's intent is unclear, courts must construe the statute in con-
formity with existing international law under Charming Betsy."4 If, on
10 Colangelo, supra note 12, at 142.
"'. For the classic articulation of this phenomenon, see Anthony A. D'Amato, The
Concept of Custom in International Law 97-98 (1971).
"'Cf. Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42
Vand. L. Rev. 819, 846 (1989) ("Diplomatic negotiations from the Revolutionary days
onward found Americans consciously attempting to depart from the law of nations-
with the intent to change international custom-on issues dealing with treaty formula-
tions and the rights of neutrals trading in wartime.").
153 See supra notes 135-42.
14Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, 509 U.S. 155, 178 n.35
(1993).
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the other hand, Congress does clearly intend to move international
law, the canons are moot-they are designed to avoid only unin-
tended international discord.155 But if Congress intends to implement
international law in a way that varies (within constitutional bounds)
from international law, that intended variation becomes a non-issue
for the next Part's discussion.
Second, the extent to which this is actually a problem, or could
be, is an empirical question impossible to answer without com-
prehensively canvassing all statutes implementing international
law. To the degree I have undertaken such an effort, U.S. imple-
menting legislation largely if not identically mirrors the interna-
tional law it seeks to implement, " ' sometimes even incorporating
the latter by reference."' This is perhaps why this issue has seldom
arisen."'
Third, the next Part does not require identical laws anyway. It is
concerned primarily with avoiding conflicts of laws, not differences in
laws. Under any permutation of what are termed "false conflicts"-
where two laws are substantially the same or lead to the same out-
come " ?9-U.S. implementing legislation that survives the Offences
Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause tests above tends to qualify
by avoiding true conflicts between U.S. and international law. And
finally, as we will see in Part IV, if a material difference does happen
155 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. (Aramco), 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991); see also
Ingrid Brunk Wuerth, Authorizations for the Use of Force, International Law, and
the Charming Betsy Canon, 46 B.C. L. Rev. 293, 333 n.181 (2005).
"6 See Colangelo, supra note 12, app. at 189-201.
151 Id. at 189; see also, e.g., United States v. Bond, 581 F.3d 128, 138 (3d Cir. 2009)
(observing that implementing legislation "closely adheres to the language of the...
Convention").
158 Apart from United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820), and United
States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479 (1887), I found only three modern cases squarely ad-
dressing the issue. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 805 (11th Cir. 2010);
United States v. Ferreira, 275 F.3d 1020, 1027-28 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v.
Lue, 134 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1998). A related but separate question involves federal-
ism concerns with Congress's power to effectuate treaties where the legislation would
otherwise fall outside of Congress's lawmaking powers. See, e.g., Bond, 581 F.3d at
135 & n.4.
,' See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985); see also id. at 838
n.20 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("'[False] conflict' really means 'no conflict of laws.' If
the laws of both states relevant to the set of facts are the same, or would produce the
same decision in the lawsuit, there is no real conflict between them." (quoting Robert
A. Leflar, American Conflicts Law § 93, at 188 (3d ed. 1977))).
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inadvertently to sneak in, the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause acts as a side constraint' 6° to block that law as applied to indi-
viduals abroad having no reasonable expectation they would be sub-
ject to it. 161
III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
This Part fills out and explores the implications of the argument
that the presumption against extraterritoriality should not apply to
statutes that implement international law and that the only relevant
rule of construction for gauging the reach of these statutes should be
the Charming Betsy canon. It begins by tracing both canons back to
the same fundamental concern: avoiding unintended discord with
foreign nations. It then argues that, based on this original motivating
concern, the presumption should not apply to statutes that imple-
ment international law because such statutes present no or minimal
risk of both conflicts with foreign law and jurisdictional overreaching.
In addition, applying the presumption to these statutes may result in
the United States failing to fulfill international obligations to exercise
jurisdiction. The presumption thus could generate exactly what it was
designed to avoid: unintended discord with foreign nations.
To illustrate, I take the early (though resurgent) example of piracy,
which is again the subject of headline-grabbing cases and also pro-
vides an analogically valuable prologue to other extraterritoriality is-
sues courts face today. I explain how the Supreme Court used an
early variety of the presumption against extraterritoriality to stunt
U.S. jurisdiction over piracy under international law and, in the proc-
ess, hobble the United States's ability to fulfill its international re-
sponsibilities contrary to Congress's intent. I next apply the approach
to recent issues like the application of U.S. laws to modern piracy
and terrorism, and the increasingly famous (and controversial)
ATS."'62 Although a jurisdictional statute enacted at the founding,'63
the ATS has generated an abundance of recent cases and a robust
60 I borrow this term from Robert Nozick. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and
Utopia 33-35 (1974).
161 See infra Part IV.
16228 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
163Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004).
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modem debate about the use of international law in U.S. courts and
the reach of U.S. jurisdiction abroad. I explain that the unified ap-
proach does a good job distinguishing laws that seek to apply interna-
tional law-like laws relating to piracy, terrorism, and the ATS-
from laws that prescribe purely national laws, like the principal anti-
fraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act, to which the Su-
preme Court just applied what amounts to a presumption against ex-
traterritoriality on steroids. 1"
The approach also holds implications for two other highly charged
ATS issues currently being litigated in lower courts and destined for
Supreme Court review:'65 whether courts should use international law
or purely federal common law as operative rules of decision and the
level of specificity and international acceptance needed for particular
norms to be actionable under the statute."6 On the first issue, if
courts use international law, the ATS should authorize suits for con-
duct abroad according to jurisdictional principles of international law
in line with this Article's thesis. But if courts apply purely federal
common-law rules, the ATS becomes essentially identical to the Ex-
change Act as a unilateral projection of U.S. domestic law abroad,
risking both conflicts with foreign law and jurisdictional overreach-
ing. 7 Consequently, the Supreme Court's decision in Morrison ap-
plying the presumption against extraterritoriality to the Exchange
Act could control construction of the ATS as well, and ATS causes of
action-to the extent they rely on federal common law--could be re-
stricted to U.S. territory.
On the second issue, because actionable ATS norms must obey
both substantive and jurisdictional international law, for a foreigner
to sue a foreigner for conduct abroad in U.S. courts, the violation
'6' See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) ("When a statute
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.").
65 See Conditional Cross-Petition for a Writ of Certiorari 14-17, Presbyterian
Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, 131 S. Ct. 122 (2010) (No. 09-1418).6'For a recent account of why the Supreme Court's current approach is partially
misguided based on the original purpose of the ATS, see Bellia & Clark, supra note
24. This Article evaluates ATS claims on the present state of the law.167Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Uni-
laterally recognizing new norms of customary international law-that is, norms that
have not been universally accepted by the rest of the civilized world-would poten-
tially create friction in our relations with foreign nations and, therefore, would con-
travene the international comity the statute was enacted to promote.").
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should be subject to universal jurisdiction under international law.'68
This casts doubt on a slew of recent cases by foreigners against for-
eign financial institutions for aiding and abetting and financing acts
of terrorism abroad ever since the Second Circuit held in United
States v. Yousef that "terrorism" is not subject to universal jurisdic-
tion because it has no commonly agreed-upon definition under inter-
national law.'69 Much like the Supreme Court in the early piracy cases
failed to extend U.S. law prohibiting piracy to the full extent of inter-
national law, the Second Circuit's holding threatens a similar failure
to extend U.S. law to certain acts of terrorism to the full extent per-
mitted by modern international law. I then explain how these cases
can, and how some already have, overcome Yousef s hurdle. Indeed
these two ATS issues-whether federal common law or international
law provides the operative rule of decision and what level of specific-
ity and international acceptance is needed for a norm to be action-
able-intersect to determine whether plaintiffs can succeed on ar-
guably one of the only avenues left for corporate liability under the
ATS: financing terrorism.7
A. The Canons' Common Concern
The presumption against extraterritoriality was born of interna-
tional law. It is nothing new to observe that the international law of
jurisdiction at the founding and up through the start of the twentieth
century was strongly territorial.'"' To borrow Chief Justice Marshall's
elegant restatement from The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is necessar-
ily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no limitation not
168 See Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on Investor Liability in Hu-
man Rights Litigation, 50 Harv. Int'l L.J. 271, 319 (2009). But see William S. Dodge,
Alien Tort Litigation and the Prescriptive Jurisdiction Fallacy, 51 Harv. Int'l L.J.
Online 35, 37 (2010) (discussed infra note 318). For an argument that "[t]he historical
meaning of the ATS does not in itself support the lower courts' continuing practice of
allowing aliens to sue other aliens under the ATS for conduct occurring outside the
United States," see Bellia & Clark, supra note 24, at 99. For purposes of this Article, I
am taking that continuing lower court practice as I find it. See also id. at 100-01
("Most lower courts have followed Filartiga's lead in allowing suits between aliens
under the ATS, and this practice has continued after Sosa.").
169 327 F.3d 56, 98-108 (2d Cir. 2003).
170 See infra Subsection III.C.2.b.
171 See Colangelo, supra note 4, at 1026; Meyer, supra note 7, at 130-32.
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imposed by itself. Any restriction upon it, deriving validity from
an external source, would imply a diminution of its sover-
eignty ....
... [Consequently] [t]his full and absolute territorial jurisdiction
being alike the attribute of every sovereign ... [is] incapable of
conferring extra-territorial power .*..172
The Court even used these international law principles later that
same century to craft the landmark personal jurisdiction decision in
Pennoyer v. Neff, translating to the U.S. interstate system "well es-
tablished principles of public law respecting the jurisdiction of an in-
dependent State over persons and property." '173 Under such princi-
ples, and echoing Marshall's language above, the Court began with
the "general, if not universal, law" that jurisdiction is "necessarily re-
stricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established.
Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be
deemed in every other forum, as has been said by this court, an ille-
gitimate assumption of power, and be resisted as mere abuse."'74
Similarly, in American Banana v. United Fruit Co., a 1909 decision
applying the presumption against extraterritoriality to limit the geo-
graphic reach of U.S. antitrust law, Justice Holmes affirmed the
"general and almost universal rule," which held "that the character
of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law
of the country where the act is done.""17 According to Holmes:
[f]or another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the
actor, to treat him according to its own notions rather than those
of the place where he did the acts, not only would be unjust, but
would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign,
contrary to the comity of nations, which the other state con-
cerned justly might resent.1 76
1 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812).
173 95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1877).
Id. at 720.
17 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909).
176 Id. This rule reflects the prevailing conflict of laws or private international law
rule at the time. Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of
American Law, 1991 Sup. Ct. Rev. 179, 186.
2011] 1059
1060 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 97:1019
Part IV explores why such an assertion of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion would be "unjust" by squarely addressing individual rights and
due process concerns. 77 The important point for this Part is that, un-
der these early rules, the mutually "exclusive and absolute ''171 juris-
diction of every nation inside its own territory by definition discour-
aged extraterritorial jurisdiction inside other nations.
The relationship to the Charming Betsy canon is obvious. If "an
act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of na-
tions if any other possible construction remains 17' 9 and international
law discourages extraterritorial jurisdiction inside other nations, stat-
utes should be construed not to apply extraterritorially unless Con-
gress indicates otherwise. 8 ' In this respect, the presumption against
extraterritoriality is essentially an outgrowth of Charming Betsy."
Both canons sprung from the same fundamental desire: avoiding dis-
cord with foreign nations through unintended clashes with interna-
tional or foreign law.
The clash with international law would be the extraterritorial ju-
risdictional overreach itself. Extending U.S. law into the territory of a
foreign nation contrary to international law would, to use Marshall's
phrase, "imply a diminution of [that nation's] sovereignty,"2 or, in
Holmes's formulation, "interfere[] with the authority of another sov-
ereign"' 3-itself a potentially serious source of international fric-
tion."' On top of that source of potential friction, the extraterritorial
projection of U.S. law would overlap, and therefore could conflict,
with a foreign nation's law within its own territory, creating a conflict
177 See Infra Part IV.
171 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136-37 (1812).
179Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy (The Charming Betsy), 6 U.S. (2
Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
,'0 John Knox points out that, regarding vessels at sea, this is better thought of as a
presumption against "extrajurisdictionality" since the high seas are not U.S. territory.
See Knox, supra note 8, at 364-65. As discussed below, see infra note 196 and accom-
panying text, and as Knox himself recognizes, however, "throughout the nineteenth
century, the Court regarded U.S.-flagged vessels as if they were floating bits of U.S.
territory." Knox, supra note 8, at 365 n.87. Whatever term one uses, the concerns
about sovereign interference and conflict of laws are the same.
... Cf. Knox, supra note 8, at 364-66.
2 McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 136.
1
.Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347,356 (1909).
18 Id.
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of national laws.' These concerns drove early extraterritoriality
cases.
B. Early Examples: The Piracy Cases
A series of piracy cases decided between 1818 and 1820 engagingly
illustrates the issues. In particular, the cases show the danger of using
the presumption against extraterritoriality to construe statutes that
implement international law, resulting in a failure to fulfill interna-
tional legal responsibilities contrary to congressional intent.
The first case is United States v. Palmer,"8 an 1818 decision that
some have identified as an early example of the presumption against
extraterritoriality." Palmer asked whether Section 8 of the first fed-
eral criminal statute," enacted in 1790 and outlawing piracy by "any
person or persons," reached high-seas robbery committed by for-
eigners, against foreigners, on a foreign-flag ship.'89 Chief Justice
Marshall made two interpretive moves to conclude that the statute
did not apply. He first looked to the title of the entire act-"an act
for the punishment of certain crimes against the United States"-to
glean that Congress's concern was with "offences against the United
States, not offences against the human race."'" This offers an early
example of the assumption that Congress legislates with only domes-
tic concerns in mind. For Marshall, the title suggested that the 1790
statute's general terms "any person or persons" did not "comprehend
every human being."''9' Rather, the "words must be limited in some
degree, and the intent of the legislature will determine the extent of
" Id. (warning against using a nation's "own notions rather than those of the place
where [the defendant] did the acts").
616 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
187 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 511; Dodge, supra note 8, at 85. But see Knox, supra
note 8, at 364 (distinguishing "extrajurisdictionality" in Palmer from extraterritorial-
ity).
88 Kontorovich, "Define and Punish" Clause, supra note 11, at 175.
Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 631. The defendants may, in fact, have been Ameri-
cans claiming allegiance to a South American republic engaged in a revolt against Spain.
Id. at 611; see also G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and International Law: The
Piracy Cases, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 727, 731 (1989). The Court, however, treated them as
non-citizens. See Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 630.
19' Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 631.
... Id. at 631-32.
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this limitation"' -which led to the second interpretive move: dis-
cerning the legislative intent.
Here Marshall's reasoning reveals the international and conflicts-
of-law motivations behind the presumption. He began by touring the
statute's language, pointing out other instances of general terms, such
as "any captain, or mariner of any ship or other vessel" and "any
seaman."'93 Noting the abundance of these other general terms, he
was troubled by the implications of using them globally.
To illustrate his concerns, Marshall offered a hypothetical example
to which we will return throughout this Section: although the statute
prohibited acts of violence against a ship's commander by "any sea-
man," according to Marshall, "it cannot be supposed that the legisla-
ture intended to punish a seaman on board a ship sailing under a for-
eign flag, under the jurisdiction of a foreign government, who should
lay violent hands upon his commander, or make a revolt in the
ship."194 The reason was that
[t]hese are offences against the nation under whose flag the ves-
sel sails, and within whose particular jurisdiction all on board the
vessel are. Every nation provides for such offences the punish-
ment its own policy may dictate; and no general words of a stat-
ute ought to be construed to embrace them when committed by
foreigners against a foreign government.9
Put another way, if the United States extended U.S. law to a for-
eign seaman on a foreign ship who committed an act of violence
against his commander, the United States would overreach its juris-
diction under international law. Such an exercise of jurisdiction not
only could interfere with the sovereignty of another nation but also
could risk conflict with that nation's law inside its own territory since,
at the time, a vessel on the high seas was deemed part of the nation's
territory under whose flag it sailed." Reasoning backward from this
12 Id.
193 Id. at 632.
194 Id.
'9' Id. at 632-33.
" Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U.S. 572, 574 (1880) ("A vessel at sea is considered as a
part of the territory to which it belongs when at home. It carries with it the local legal
rights and legal jurisdiction of such locality."); see also St. Clair v. United States, 154
U.S. 134, 152 (1894); United States v. Smiley, 27 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (C.C.N.D. Cal.
1864) (No. 16,317).
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proposition about "any seaman" to the "any person" language di-
rectly at issue in the case, Marshall found that like other terms of lit-
erally global but, in his view, implicitly limited scope, neither did the
term "any person" embrace literally any person. Whom the term did
embrace, however, was not settled by Palmer; and the answer came
two years later in United States v. Klintock 7
To fully understand Klintock, it is important to appreciate what
happened in the interim. Palmer was "roundly criticized by contem-
poraries" for limiting the scope of the 1790 statute and thereby stunt-
ing the United States's ability to prosecute piracy under the law of
nations,19' which all agreed included robbery on the high seas." In
one famous criticism, John Quincy Adams renounced Palmer as "a
sample of judicial logic-disingenuous, false, and hollow" and an
"enormous hole in the moral garment of this nation made by this
desperate thrust of the Supreme Court."2 " In fact, in 1819, the year
after Palmer was decided, Congress passed a new piracy statute to
remedy precisely the hole Palmer had hewn. The statute punished,
accordingly, "any person or persons whatsoever" who "shall, on the
high seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of na-
tions."' As we will see, the definition of piracy under the law of na-
tions becomes crucial to determining the jurisdictional reach of the
statute under this Article's thesis-but first the Court's decision in
Klintock.
Klintock was decided in 1820 and dealt with the same section of
the same 1790 statute as Palmer (since the defendant had been ac-
cused prior to the enactment of the 1819 statute).21 The facts were
" 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820).
98 White, supra note 189, at 731; see also Kontorovich, "Define and Punish" Clause,
supra note 11, at 187.See infra note 229 and accompanying text.2
1 j. Q. Adams, diary entry for May 11, 1819, in 4 The Memoirs of John Quincy Ad-
ams 363 (C. Adams ed., 1874-77).201 Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14; see also United States v.
Hasan, No. 2:10cr56, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115746, at *39 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2010)
("In response to the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Act of 1790 in Palmer,
Congress passed the Act of 1819 to make clear that it wished to proscribe not only
piratical acts that had a nexus to the United States, but also piracy as an international
offense subject to universal jurisdiction."); Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy 158
(2d ed. 1998) ("The immediate result of U.S. v. Palmer in the halls of the Congress
was the passage of [the Act of 1819] ... ").
2o2 Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 151-52.
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similar to Palmer, except the defendant in Klintock was a U.S. citizen
and the acts were committed on a stateless, instead of a foreign-flag,
vessel. 3 As in Palmer, Marshall penned the opinion for the Court.
Klintock, however, came out the other way.
On the issue of the statute's reach, Marshall began by distinguish-
ing Palmer on the status of the ship. The Chief Justice explained that
the rule in Palmer "appl[ied] exclusively to a robbery or murder
committed by a person on board of any ship or vessel belonging ex-
clusively to subjects of a foreign State."2" And, leaving no doubt as to
the narrowness of Palmer's holding, Marshall reiterated that for it to
govern, the ship "must at the time be sailing under the flag of a for-
eign State, whose authority is acknowledged. This is the case which
was presented to the Court [in Palmer]; and this is the case which was
decided. 2 5 Not so in Klintock. Because the acts were committed
by persons on board of a vessel not at the time belonging to the
subjects of any foreign power, but in possession of a crew acting
in defiance of all law, and acknowledging obedience to no gov-
ernment whatever, [their conduct] is within the true meaning of
this act, and is punishable in the Courts of the United States.06
Marshall went on to observe that while general statutory terms
"ought not to be so construed as to extend to persons under the ac-
knowledged authority of a foreign State, [such terms] ought to be so
construed as to comprehend those who acknowledge the authority of
no State."2 7 In short, the international and conflict-of-laws concerns
that had animated limiting the 1790 statute in Palmer vanished in
Klintock by virtue of the vessel's statelessness. Because of this status,
application of U.S. law did not infringe another nation's sovereignty
and could not conflict with another nation's laws on its own flag ves-
sel, or floating piece of its territory.0 8
Although Marshall did his best to atrophy Palmer through the con-
struct of statelessness, the decision partially survived and in ways that
203 Id. at 144, 147-48.
204 Id. at 151.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 152.
207 Id.
" This had actually been argued by the Attorney General in Klintock to distinguish
the case from Palmer, id. at 146-48, and the Chief Justice bit.
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potentially curtailed U.S. jurisdiction over piracy under the law of na-
tions: namely, where the crime occurred on a foreign-flag ship. This
made the 1819 statute still necessary, and led Justice Johnson in an-
other 1820 piracy case, United States v. Furlong, to declare that
[i]f such cases occur under the act of 1790, I shall respectfully so-
licit a revision of Palmer's case, if it be considered as including
those cases.... under the belief that it never could have been the
intention of Congress that such an offender should find this
country a secure assylum to him.
Johnson instead proposed a different rule of construction, and one
that matches up quite neatly with the approach espoused by this Ar-
ticle: "in construing [statutory scope] we should test each case by a
reference to the punishing powers of the body that enacted it. '21° Under
this rule, "[t]he reasonable presumption is... general words made
use of in that law, ought not.., to be restricted so as to exclude any
cases within their natural meaning., 21' According to Johnson, "this
view of the subject appears to me to furnish the only sufficient key to
the construction of the 8th section of the act of 1790.212
Johnson therefore sought to use the source of Congress's powers
in enacting the law to inform the law's jurisdictional scope. Under
this construction, Johnson explained, Congress did not "intend[]...
[to] leave unpunished the crime of piracy in any cases in which they
might punish it. '213 To understand "the cases in which [Congress]
might punish it," and how Johnson's-and this Article's-approach
work, we must return to the definition of piracy.
What has gone largely undetected in both the cases themselves
and commentary since they were decided is that the 1790 statute ac-
tually outlawed two types of piracy: piracy under the law of nations
and piracy under municipal law, or what was called "piracy by stat-
ute." These were different offenses with different attendant jurisdic-
tional rules. As I now show, they should have been construed differ-
ently, but were not. The analysis here requires some delicate turns
given the law at the time and the poor drafting of the 1790 statute.
209 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184,198-99 (1820).
210 Id. at 195-96 (emphasis added).
211 Id. at 196.




But courts today are being forced to rediscover this very distinction
to prosecute modem day piracy, 4 and the larger discussion sets a
rich analogical stage for the next Section where I connect the Court's
mistake in these early piracy cases to more recent cases involving,
among other things, modem piracy, terrorism, and the ATS.
1. Piracy under the Law of Nations
The 1790 statute at issue in these early piracy cases was the first
federal criminal statute."5 It was enacted by the first Congress and
outlawed a wide range of activity.216 Its broad definition of piracy,
which, as we know from Marshall's hypothetical in Palmer, included
acts like "lay[ing] violent hands upon [one's] commander,,1 17 not only
troubled the Chief Justice but has perplexed scholars as well, leading
one expert recently to note that "[t]he reasons, if any, for the lan-
guage are unknown.""21 Yet upon inspection, the 1790 statute tracks
in part Blackstone's definition of piracy in his Commentaries, whose
influence on the founding generation is well known."9 Indeed Black-
stone's authority in this area has not much waned; recent decisions
show his enduring and powerful influence on how the Supreme
Court interprets the scope of early statutes implementing interna-
tional law, such as the ATS.22°
According to Blackstone, "piracy, by common law, consists in
committing those acts of robbery and depredation upon the high
seas, which, if committed upon land, would have amounted to felony
there. '"221 The 1790 act similarly defined piracy "upon the high seas"
as "robbery, or any other offence, which, if committed within the
body of a county, would, by the laws of the United States, be punish-
214 United States v. Hasan, No. 2:10cr56, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115746, at *18-20
(E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2010) (discussing the difference between "general piracy" and
"municipal piracy").
25 Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
216 Id.
217 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 627 (1818).
2
,
8Kontorovich, "Define and Punish" Clause, supra note 11, at 176.
Bullard v. Bell, 4 F. Cas. 624, 632 (C.C.D.N.H. 1817) (No. 2,121); The Ann, 1 F. Cas.
926, 927 (C.C.D. Mass. 1812) (No. 397); 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787,
at 472 (Max Farrand ed., 1911); 2 id. at 448.
220 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 714-16, 719-24, 737 (2004).
" 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *72.
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able with death. 222 At the time, felony meant a serious crime punish-
able by death.2' The 1790 statute thus codified in part the common-
law definition of piracy as described by Blackstone. This was in keep-
ing with "the relationship between common law and positive law in
the late 18th century, when positive law was frequently relied upon to
reinforce and give standard expression to the 'brooding omnipres-
ence' of the common law., 224 The 1790 statute's codification of com-
mon-law piracy was also the definition squarely at issue in Palmer:
robbery on the high seas.225
Three key features of this definition unlock its jurisdictional poten-
tial. First, it captured the definition of piracy under the law of na-
tions.226 In another piracy case of the era, United States v. Smith, 7
which interpreted the 1819 statute's language punishing piracy "as
defined by the law of nations, famed intemationalist Justice Story
explained that "robbery, or forcible depredations upon the sea,
animo furandi, is piracy. 229
Second, at the time Blackstone wrote,30 and in the United States
when these early piracy cases were decided," the law of nations was
considered part of the common law. Describing this jurisprudential
dynamic, Story explained that
[t]he common law... recognises and punishes piracy as an of-
fence, not against its own municipal code, but as an offence
against the law of nations, (which is part of the common law,) as
222 Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 626.
2 Blackstone, supra note 221, at *94.
22 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 722 (internal citation omitted). Or, as Blackstone explained:
those acts of parliament, which have from time to time been made to enforce
this universal law, or to facilitate the execution of [its] decisions, are not to be
considered as introductive of any new rule, but merely as declaratory of the old
fundamental constitutions of the kingdom; without which it must cease to be a
part of the civilized world.
Blackstone, supra note 221, at *67.
225 Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 626.
226 An exception would be standard murder committed by a foreigner, against a for-
eigner, on a foreign-flag vessel. See United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184,
196-98 (1820).
227 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
22 Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14.
2 Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 161.
3 See Blackstone, supra note 221, at *72.
2" See Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 161-62.
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an offence against the universal law of society, a pirate being
12deemed an enemy of the human race.
Blackstone similarly described the pirate as "hostis humani gene-
ris"-an enemy of the human race-who had committed "an offence
against the universal law of society"" and was punishable under "the
law of nations, as a part of the common law.
2
1
Third, with respect to the particular offense of piracy under the
law of nations, there existed what was, at the time of these cases, and
is still now, called "universal jurisdiction., 235 That is, any nation had
jurisdiction over piracy under the law of nations, irrespective of who
perpetrated the crime or the status of the ships involved. Story de-
scribed these three features with far more concision than I have. Ac-
cording to Story, piracy was
an offence against the law of nations, and.., its true definition
by that law is robbery upon the sea. And the general practice of
all nations in punishing all persons, whether natives or foreign-
ers, who have committed this offence against any persons what-
soever, with whom they are in amity, is a conclusive proof that
the offence is supposed to depend, not upon the particular provi-
sions of any municipal code, but upon the law of nations, both for
its definition and punishment.236
To sum up, the definition of piracy at issue in Palmer codified and
tracked Blackstone's definition of common-law piracy. It was an of-
fense not against municipal law, but against the law of nations, over
which all states had universal jurisdiction irrespective of national





2 Blackstone, supra note 221, at *71.
Id. at *73.
"' United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820).
26 Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 162.
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Piracy as Defined by the Law of Nations:
Substantively: robbery, forcible depredations on the high seas
Jurisdictionally: subject to universal jurisdiction by all statesgI
Part of the Common Law both for Blackstone and in early
19th Century United States
Definition codified by Section 8 of the 1790 U.S. Statute
(directly at issue in Palmer)
2. Piracy by Statute
But the similarities between the 1790 statute and Blackstone do
not end there. Blackstone explained further that, in addition to the
common-law definition of piracy (which again, incorporated the law
of nations), "by statute, some other offences are made piracy also., 237
For example, Blackstone observed that "any commander, or other
seafaring person... running away with any ship, boat, ordnance,
ammunition, or goods; or yielding them up voluntarily to a pirate"
could be guilty of piracy by statute.238 Significantly, the 1790 statute
reflected this same piracy by statute: "if any captain or mariner of
any ship or other vessel, shall piratically and feloniously run away
with such ship or vessel, or any goods or merchandize... or yield up
such ship or vessel voluntarily to any pirate," he would be guilty of
piracy. 39
Moreover, according to Blackstone, piracy by statute included
"any person confining the commander of a vessel, to hinder him from
fighting in defence of his ship, or to cause a revolt on board., 241 Like-
wise-and as we know from Marshall's use of this very language for
his hypothetical in Palmer-the 1790 statute defined a pirate as "any
seaman [who] shall lay violent hands upon his commander, thereby
to hinder and prevent his fighting in defence of his ship.., or [who]
23' Blackstone, supra note 221, at *72.
..Id.
2' United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 626-27 (1818).2 40Blackstone, supra note 221, at *72.
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shall make a revolt in the ship. 241 The correspondence between the
two definitions is plain.
What is striking for present purposes is that the parallel definitions
employ virtually identical general terms like "any commander"242 and
"any captain, 2 43 and any "seafaring person",2 4 and "any seaman','245
precisely the terms Marshall construed in limited fashion in Palmer
and then reasoned backward from to limit U.S. jurisdiction over clas-
sic piracy under the law of nations by "any person" at issue in that
case. 46 The problem that emerges in sharp relief when one reads the
1790 statute next to Blackstone is that the general terms from which
Marshall reasoned backward relate exclusively to what both Black-
stone and international lawyers at the time the case was decided des-
ignated "piracy... by statute.
2 7
This was not the same as piracy under the law of nations. Piracy by
statute was instead a label affixed by municipal law to crimes that did
not constitute piracy under the law of nations but which municipal
legal systems wished to condemn with equal force.24 And, unlike pi-
racy under the law of nations, which had a uniform definition, defini-
tions of piracy by statute could vary across municipal legal systems.249
Thus, piracy by statute was not an offense under international law
but instead comprised "certain acts which are considered piracy by
the internal laws of a State, to which the law of nations does not at-
tach the same signification.""25
Importantly, laws regarding piracy by statute were jurisdiction-
ally limited.25' As one renowned nineteenth-century international
241 Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 627.
242 Blackstone, supra note 221, at *72.
243 Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 626.
24 Blackstone, supra note 221, at *72.
245 Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 627.
246 Id. at 632-33.
2 47 Blackstone, supra note 221, at *72; 10 Annals of Cong. 600 (1800) (distinguishing
piracy "under the law of nations" from "piracy by statute" and warning against "con-
founding" the two, which would lead to "indistinct" jurisdiction).248 Kontorovich, "Define and Punish" Clause, supra note 11, at 166.
24 See 10 Annals of Cong. 600 (1800) (statement of John Marshall) ("A statute may
make any offence piracy, committed within the jurisdiction of the nation passing the
statute....").
... Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law, § 124, at 164 (George Grafton
Wilson ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1936) (1866). For a good discussion, see Kontorovich,
"Define and Punish" Clause, supra note 11, at 166.
2 Kontorovich, "Define and Punish" Clause, supra note 11, at 166.
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lawyer and statesman explained, piracy by statute "can only be ap-
plied.., with reference to [a nation's] own subjects, and in places
within its own jurisdiction., 25 2 Accordingly, and in contrast to pi-
racy under the law of nations, which was subject to universal juris-
diction, "piracy created by municipal statute can only be tried by
that State within whose territorial jurisdiction" or "on board of
whose vessels, the offence thus created was committed., 253 Indeed
Marshall himself had made this very distinction in a famous speech,
warning against "confounding general piracy with piracy by stat-
ute," and declaring that
[a] statute may make any offence piracy, committed within the
jurisdiction of the nation passing the statute, and such offence
will be punishable by that nation. But piracy under the law of na-
tions ... alone is punishable by all nations .... No particular na-
tion can increase or diminish the list of offences thus punish-
able.254
In sum, the 1790 statute tracking in part Blackstone's definition
prohibited two types of piracy, each with its own jurisdictional rule:
piracy under the law of nations by "any person," which was subject
to universal jurisdiction, and piracy by statute committed by, for
example, "any captain" or "any seaman" against the safety of the
ship, which was subject only to territorial or flag jurisdiction.
Marshall's mistake in Palmer was extrapolating jurisdictional
limits over piracy by statute to constrain U.S. jurisdiction over pi-
racy under the law of nations, thereby hobbling the United States's
ability to punish piracy under international law-a mistake Con-
gress remedied the very next year by enacting a new statute pun-
ishing "any person or persons whatsoever" who "shall, on the high
seas, commit the crime of piracy, as defined by the law of na-
tions."'255 Another diagram may be helpful here:
Wheaton, supra note 250, at 164. Wheaton's treatise was later relied upon by the
Supreme Court in the famous international law decision, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677,691 (1900).253 Wheaton, supra note 250, at 164.
2. United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 862 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175).
2" Act of Mar. 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 5, 3 Stat. 510, 513-14 (emphasis added).
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Piracy by Statute:
Substantively: municipal offense, definition varied across jurisdic-
tions; though both Blackstone and 1790 statute (tracking Black-
stone) include as piracy by statute preventing commanders from de-
fending their ships
Jurisdictionally: subject only to national, territorial, or flag jurisdic-
tion; no universal jurisdictionIg
Codified by Section 8 of the 1790 U.S. Statute (not directly
at issue in Palmer but used as a hypothetical example of the interna-
tional jurisdictional and conflict of laws problems with construing
general terms globally)
Palmer highlights the mistake of using a presumption against ex-
traterritoriality to construe statutes that implement international
law. By worrying about jurisdictional overreach and conflicts with
foreign law, Marshall limited the United States's ability to punish
piracy under the law of nations, contrary to congressional intent.
To be sure, these worries vanished in Klintock: because the ship
was deemed stateless, U.S. law did not apply inside another na-
tion's territory, or flag vessel, as the case may be. Klintock accord-
ingly makes some sense in light of the early presumption's con-
cerns.
My point, however, is that this was the wrong presumption, ac-
companied by the wrong concerns, to use in these cases. And,
when viewed under the right presumption-the Charming Betsy
canon-there was never any threat of international discord result-
ing from jurisdictional overreach or conflicts with foreign law.
Rather, just the opposite: by limiting U.S. jurisdiction over piracy
under the law of nations, the Court's parochial construction threat-
ened precisely what the canons were designed to avoid: uninten-
tional international discord, here by jeopardizing the young na-
tion's ability to fulfill its international responsibility to combat
piracy. The proof, after all, was the immediate enactment of a new
piracy statute punishing "any person or persons whatsoever" who
commit "piracy, as defined by the law of nations.""2 6 The reasoning
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behind this position, perhaps evident already in my discussion of
the cases, is nonetheless worth setting out in condensed form and
proceeds as follows.
A distinction existed that reference to Blackstone helps identify
between, on the one hand, the 1790 statute's codification of the
common-law offense of piracy, and, on the other, what was called
piracy by statute. The common-law definition implemented the law
of nations, while piracy by statute was solely a creature of a na-
tion's "internal, 25 7 or municipal law. This distinction cuts to the
heart of why, while prosecuting piracy by statute may have created
a conflict of national laws since definitions could vary across mu-
nicipal legal systems,258 using the common-law definition to prose-
cute, as the Court had been asked to do in Palmer, simply could
not result in a conflict.
There could be no conflict of laws because there was, in effect,
only one law being applied-the law of nations, under which piracy
had a fixed definition that indisputably included robbery on the
high seas.259 In this connection, Justice Story's elucidation bears re-
peating: the offense was prosecuted as "an offence, not against [a
nation's] own municipal code, but as an offence against the law of
nations, (which is part of the common law[]). ' 2 As such, "the of-
fence is supposed to depend, not upon the particular provisions of
any municipal code, but upon the law of nations, both for its defini-
tion and punishment."26' Consequently, using the law of nations
definition did not, indeed could not, produce a conflict of laws. As
a matter of international law, nations had agreed upon the offense
definition of piracy; U.S. courts merely implemented via domestic
legislative and judicial mechanisms the international legal prohibi-
tion.
Yet there might still remain a problem of jurisdictional over-
reach. Even if nations agreed as a matter of international law that
robbery on the high seas constituted piracy, thereby erasing any
conflict of laws where U.S. law implemented the international pro-
hibition, the United States might still jurisdictionally overextend by
257 Wheaton, supra note 250, at 164.
258 See 10 Annals of Cong. 600 (1800).
259 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 161-62 (1820).
260 Id. at 161.
261 Id. at 162.
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punishing the offense, as Marshall had speculated, "on board a ship
sailing under a foreign flag, under the jurisdiction of a foreign gov-
ernment." '262 But Charming Betsy erases this concern as well. In
fact, it cuts the other way in these cases.
Unlike piracy by statute, which as a creature of solely municipal
law applied only to a state's own nationals or vessels, piracy under
the law of nations was subject to universal jurisdiction.263 It was
punishable by all states, irrespective of the nationality of the perpe-
trators, victims, or vessels involved."6 And like all nations, the
United States had an international obligation to repress it.265 By
limiting the reach of U.S. law over the international crime in
Palmer, Marshall constrained the United States's ability to fulfill
this international responsibility and hence perversely accomplished
exactly what the canons were designed to avoid: potential discord
with foreign nations. In addition, employing the Charming Betsy
canon in this context disabuses courts of the assumption that Con-
gress always legislates with only domestic concerns in mind. The
more sensible assumption is that when Congress implements inter-
national substantive law-like the law against piracy-it also im-
plements attendant international jurisdictional law, which by its na-
ture deals with foreign concerns and, in the case of piracy,
encouraged if not obligated the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion. Using Charming Betsy in this way also turns the separation of
powers concern on its head. By restricting U.S. jurisdiction over pi-
racy against the law of nations in Palmer, Marshall substituted his
own foreign policy judgment for that of the political branches.266
262 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610, 632 (1818). Notably, Marshall
stated this concern with respect to piracy by statute. As discussed above, he then used
this construction by extension to limit the 1790 statute's prohibition on piracy under
the law of nations.
263 United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 197 (1820); Smith, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) at 161-62.
264 Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 161-62; see also Blackstone, supra note 221, at *71
("[T]he crime of piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high seas, is an offence
against the universal law of society; a pirate being... hostis humani generis. As there-
fore he has renounced all the benefits of society and government.., by declaring war
against all mankind, all mankind must declare war against him: so that every commu-
nity hath a right.., to inflict that punishment upon him.... ").
265 Blackstone, supra note 221, at *71.
266 See Knox, supra note 8, at 387.
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Again, the immediate post-Palmer enactment of the 1819 piracy
statute validates such a view.
The better approach in these cases would have been to accord
piracy, as an offense under the law of nations, its attendant rule of
universal jurisdiction under the law of nations, and to accord piracy
by statute, as a municipal offense, the presumption against extra-
territoriality. This reading better comports with congressional in-
tent than Marshall's incongruous construction in Palmer, which
mixed the two. Arriving at this reading admittedly required some
technical maneuvering in light of the law at the time and overcom-
ing the 1790 statute's sloppy drafting. But unpacking the cases in
this way supplies a wonderfully intricate illustration of a problem
that has continuing relevance right up to the present day.
C. Modern Examples: Piracy, Terrorism, and the A TS
A lot has changed about the nature and substance of interna-
tional law since the early piracy cases, including international law's
evolving constitutive processes and seemingly ever-expanding sub-
ject matter. But the law of nations then, as now, comprised cus-
tomary norms derived from the practice of states accompanied by a
sense of legal obligation, or opinio juris. 6 Early courts engaged in
extensive divination exercises to translate these often raw norms
into domestic rules of decision for specific offenses. For instance,
the Supreme Court in Smith faced the question, under the 1819 pi-
racy statute, of whether "the crime of piracy is defined by the law
of nations with reasonable certainty."2 To answer this question,
Justice Story resorted to the writings of no less than twenty-five
publicists, or scholars,"' to conclude that international law defined
piracy with reasonable certainty to mean robbery on the high
seas.270
The modern proliferation of ATS litigation displays continued
wrangling over the scope of offenses under the law of nations, par-
67 Jay, supra note 152, at 822-23.2
" Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 160.
269 United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 100 n.33 (2d Cir. 2003) ("'Publicists' is an
antique word used in the parlance of international law as a synonym for writers who,
in other areas of scholarship, are called 'scholars'.....
20 Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) at 161, 163 n.8.
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ticularly regarding secondary liability,27' as well as methodological
disputes over how to properly determine that scope.2 Yet the core
definitional substance of most offenses is now spelled out in detail
in positive international law, or treaties. These instruments reflect
not only positive legal consensus but also powerful evidence of cus-
tom by virtue of the practice of states entering into and undertak-
ing obligations pursuant to such agreements."3 Treaties have long
been considered generators of customary law, especially where
their provisions are intended to be generalizable to non-state par-
ties... as prohibitions on modern international offenses tend to be."5
Thus instead of having to cull an international consensus from the
multitude of definitions proffered by various international law
scholars, today Justice Story could simply look to the definition of
piracy in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("UNCLOS"), which has been ratified by nearly every nation in
the world. 6 Story actually presaged such a resource in Smith when
he lamented the indeterminacy of offenses against the law of na-
tions, noting that "[o]ffences ... against the law of nations, cannot,
with any accuracy, be said to be completely ascertained and de-
fined in any public code recognised by the common consent of na-
271 See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 255-76 (S.D.N.Y.
2009); see also Chim~ne I. Keitner, Conceptualizing Complicity in Alien Tort Cases,
60 Hastings L.J. 61, 61-65 (2008); Michael D. Ramsey, International Law Limits on
Investor Liability in Human Rights Litigation, 50 Harv. Int'l L.J. 271, 272-75 (2009).
272 See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 140 (2d Cir. 2010)
(critiquing the district court's "improper methodology for discerning norms of cus-
tomary international law"); id. at 149-53 (Leval, J., concurring in the judgment) (dis-
agreeing with the majority's methodology).273 Id. at 137-38 (majority); Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 256 (2d Cir.
2003); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 273 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); see also
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Legal Limits of Universal Jurisdiction, 47 Va. J. Int'l L. 149,
169-70 (2006).
174 North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den. & Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 41 (Feb. 20)
(explaining that generalizable treaty provisions are "indeed one of the recognized meth-
ods by which new rules of customary international law may be formed"); see also Re-
statement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of The United States § 102(3) (1987) ("In-
ternational agreements create law for the states parties thereto and may lead to the
creation of customary international law when such agreements are intended for adher-
ence by states generally and are in fact widely accepted.").
275 See infra notes 373-77 and accompanying text.
276 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 101, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.
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tions. ' ' 277 Today such a code exists in the form of multilateral trea-
ties.
Unfortunately, some modern courts have failed to recognize this
resource. For example, a recent decision involving application of
the current U.S. statute outlawing "piracy as defined by the law of
nations 27 18 to activity off the coast of Somalia explicitly and
bizarrely refused to use the widely-accepted UNCLOS definition
to elaborate the definition in Smith, instead holding that because
there was no domestic case on point between 1820 and 2010, "pi-
racy as defined by the law of nations" is still restricted to Smith's
survey of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century scholars' views.79
Fortunately, another decision in the same court took the better
view and found that the definition of piracy in the statute em-
braced an evolving law of nations reflected in widely ratified trea-
ties like UNCLOS.
The subject matter of international law has also changed since
the early piracy cases. Back then, the principal offenses against the
law of nations continued to reflect Blackstone's catalogue, which
was limited to "three kinds[:] 1. Violation of safe-conducts; 2. In-
fringement of the rights of embassadors; and, 3. Piracy., 21' Interna-
tional law's subject matter thus dealt primarily with nations' rela-
tions with each other, and acts outside the territorial control of any
nation that threatened them all.' By contrast, today international
law deals with how a nation treats its own citizens within its own
2 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 159 (1820).
278 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (2006).
279 United States v. Said, No. 2:10cr57, 2010 WL 3893761, at *8-9 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17,
2010) (memorandum and opinion order on Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss).
Smith also did not purport to provide an exhaustive definition. It merely held that the
conduct at issue in that case, robbery on the high seas, was piracy. 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.)
at 161-62.
' United States v. Hasan, No. 2:10cr56, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115746, at *120
(E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2010) ("UNCLOS... reflects the definitive modern definition of
general piracy under customary international law.").
Blackstone, supra note 221, at *68.
See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 749 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part) ("That portion of the general common law known as the law of nations was [at the
founding] understood to refer to the accepted practices of nations in their dealings with




territory' and offenses that might occur entirely within a nation's
territorial control not directly involving relations with other na-
tions at all.2"
A third international legal development is jurisdictional. In
marked departure from the strict territoriality at the founding, in-
ternational law now authorizes extraterritorial jurisdiction in a va-
riety of situations. Under modern international law, states may ex-
ercise jurisdiction not only over acts that occur within their
territories but also over acts abroad that have, or are intended to
have, effects within their territories-or what is called objective
territoriality."5 States may also assert jurisdiction over acts by their
nationals abroad-or active personality jurisdiction-as well as
over acts against their nationals in some circumstances-or passive
personality jurisdiction.' In addition, states may claim jurisdiction
over acts abroad that threaten "the security of the state or other of-
fenses threatening the integrity of governmental functions," like
espionage or counterfeiting the state's currency27-what is often
referred to as the protective principle.' Finally, the category of
universal jurisdiction offenses has expanded beyond piracy to in-
clude other offenses against the law of nations. 9 It is this last cate-
gory that has been the subject of heated debate in suits brought by
foreigners under the ATS and in criminal terrorism cases.
..
3 See Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 249 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[O]ffenses
that may be purely intra-national in their execution, such as official torture, extrajudi-
cial killings, and genocide, do violate customary international law because the 'nations
of the world' have demonstrated that such wrongs are of 'mutual... concern' and ca-
pable of impairing international peace and security." (internal citation omitted)); see
also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights arts. 6-27, Dec. 19, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
See Flores, 414 F.3d at 249.
2 Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 402(1)(c)
(1987).
"6 Id. § 402(3), cmt. g.
28 Id. § 402(3), cmt. f.
2mId.
"9 For a catalogue of current universal jurisdiction offenses, see Colangelo, supra
note 12, app. at 189-99.
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1. The Resurgence of the Presumption
In light of these international legal developments, it is important
to appreciate exactly what is at stake in selecting the appropriate
canon of construction for geographically silent U.S. statutes: strict
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality would
necessarily wipe out all international law bases of extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Thus any criminal statute outlawing, or civil statute
creating relief for, violations of international law that is silent on
geographic scope would be construed to apply only inside U.S. ter-
ritory. Hence arguments that courts should apply the presumption
to limit the ATS to U.S territory since the statute provides in its
entirety that "[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."2"
The U.S. government has in fact taken this position in recent
ATS litigation,29 as have defendants.2" The government argued
specifically that "[t]he presumption against extraterritorial legisla-
tion.., at the time the ATS was adopted. . . applied with respect to
statutes adopted by Congress to enforce the laws of nations." '293 To
make this argument, the government relied on none other than
United States v. Palmer,29 a case wrongly decided under this Arti-
cle's thesis.295
Yet on the current state of the law there is force to claims that
the presumption against extraterritoriality should apply to the
ATS. Indeed, such claims are right now stronger than ever in light
of the Supreme Court's recent reinvigoration of the presumption in
29o 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
291 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12, Am.
Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (No. 07-919) ("When construing
a federal statute, there is a strong presumption that Congress does not intend to ex-
tend U.S. law over conduct that occurs in foreign countries." (citing EEOC v. Arabian
Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))); see also John B. Bellinger III, Enforcing
Human Rights in U.S. Courts and Abroad: The Alien Tort Statute and Other Ap-
proaches, 42 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 1, 6-7 (2009).
292 See Lev v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 08 CV 3251 (NG)(VVP), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16887, at *23 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010).
293 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 12, Am.
Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, 553 U.S. 1028 (2008) (No. 07-919).
294 Id.
295 See supra Section III.B.
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Morrison v. National Australia Bank.29 There, the Court fiercely
and uncompromisingly rejected lower courts' transformation of the
presumption against extraterritoriality in the securities context into
a series of tests resembling international law principles of jurisdic-
tion."7 For forty years, lower courts had been using these tests to
extend U.S. securities laws abroad. Under the "effects test," courts
looked to "whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect
in the United States or upon United States citizens." '298 This
matches up with the objective territoriality basis of jurisdiction in
international law.2 And under the "conduct test," courts looked to
"whether the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States."3°°
This matches up with the subjective territoriality basis in interna-
tional law.3" '
The conduct test was the more apposite in Morrison, which in-
volved alleged fraudulent conduct in the United States affecting
shares of a foreign bank purchased by foreign plaintiffs on a for-
eign exchange."° The Court's application of the presumption
against extraterritoriality abolished the conduct and effects tests
and replaced them with a narrow localization rule reminiscent of
the traditional approach to conflict of laws.f3 The Court held that
because the Exchange Act contains no "clear" or "affirmative indi-
cation" that it applies extraterritorially, it does not. " Rather, for
claims relating to securities not registered on a U.S. exchange, the
Act applies only to an actual purchase or sale in the United
296 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
297 Id. at 2873.
29 SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003).
299 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 402(1)(c) (1987).
30Berger, 322 F.3d at 192-93.
301 See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 402(1)(a) (1987).
3
2 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869, 2875-76.
303 Id. at 2879-81. Lea Brilmayer has aptly labeled this the "focus" step of the
Court's analysis. Brilmayer, supra note 105, at 5. After Morrison, Congress passed the
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which authorizes the
SEC to pursue conduct in the United States that harms investors outside the United
States. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 929P(c)(1), 124 Stat. 1376, 1864 (2010).
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
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States-as opposed to fraudulent conduct in the United States that
predicates a purchase or sale abroad.0 5
After Morrison, courts and litigants now must answer the follow-
ing question, crucial to maintaining a cause of action for foreign
conduct where U.S. statutes are silent on geographic reach: if the
presumption against extraterritoriality applies so vigorously in the
securities context, why does it not also apply with equal vigor in
other contexts? For example, why does it not apply with the same
force to the ATS? Both statutes have equally general terms. The
Exchange Act language at issue in Morrison was "the purchase or
sale of any security,"" which the Court construed to mean "the
purchase or sale of any ... security in the United States.""3 7 Simi-
larly, the ATS creates jurisdiction for "any civil action ... for a
tort."3"8 Why should courts construe this general language any dif-
ferently than the language in Morrison, under which the ATS
would be construed to mean "any civil action for a tort in the
United States"?3 9
Moreover, according to the Supreme Court, the legislative his-
tory of the ATS reveals a territorial focus: to provide redress for
offenses committed against aliens in the United States."0 In the
pre-constitutional period, the central government's inability to
3o' Id. at 2884-86.
'06 Id. at 2881.307Id. at 2888 (emphasis added).
' 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
3
"'The Exchange Act's language may well be more indicative of extraterritorial ap-
plication, since it prohibits fraud "in connection with the purchase or sale of any secu-
rity registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered." 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
31
' Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715-18 (2004). Attorney General William
Bradford's 1795 opinion discusses the possibility of suit against U.S. citizens for
"join[ing] ... a French fleet in attacking the settlement [in Africa], and plundering or
destroying the property of British subjects on that coast." Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op.
Att'y Gen. 57, 58 (1795). It is not clear, however, how courts will read the opinion.
The Second Circuit recently observed, for example, that "Attorney General Bradford
circumscribes his opinion, appearing to conclude that the Company could not bring
suit for the actions taken by the Americans in a foreign country, but rather, could sue
only for the actions taken by the Americans on the 'high seas."' Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 142 n.44 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting the opinion's
language that "as the transactions complained of originated or took place in a foreign
country, they are not within the cognizance of our courts .... But crimes committed
on the high seas are within the jurisdiction of the district and circuit courts of the
United States ..." Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att'y Gen. at 58).
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provide such redress and the decentralized jurisdiction of the states
over such issues was a source of international discomfort and po-
tential friction."' One incident in particular involving an insult to
the Secretary of the French Legion in Philadelphia appears to have
played a key role in sparking the statute.312 Thus both the generality
of the statute's language and its legislative history as courts pres-
ently read it313 easily could point toward applying the presumption
against extraterritoriality to the ATS.
Lastly, the Court was unmoved in Morrison by the argument
that, because Congress had taken no action legislatively to limit the
geographic reach of the Exchange Act during the forty years courts
had been construing it extraterritorially, Congress had tacitly ap-
proved the expansive construction courts had given it. 1' The ATS
lay largely dormant for nearly 200 years until it was famously re-
booted by the Second Circuit in 1980 in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala15 Fi-
lartiga applied it to allow suit by Paraguayan plaintiffs against a
Paraguayan defendant for torture committed in Paraguay,"6 and a
flood of extraterritorial ATS claims followed. If the Supreme
Court was willing to casually overturn forty years of extraterritori-
ality case law in the securities context, there is little reason to think
the Court would hesitate to overturn thirty years of case law in the
ATS context.
Accordingly, unless one can come up with a principled reason
for treating one context differently than the other, entertaining
causes of action for foreign harms under the ATS is in open ten-
sion with Morrison's robust revitalization of the presumption
against extraterritoriality. The ATS's coverage therefore is now
conceivably susceptible to judicial trimming all the way back to
U.S. borders. The distinguishing principle this Article advances is
3, Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715-20.
312 Id. at 716-17.
", Id. at 712-20.
See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2890 (2010) (Stevens, J., con-
curring) ("Congress invited an expansive role for judicial elaboration when it crafted
such an open-ended statute .... And both Congress and the Commission subsequently
affirmed that role when they left intact the relevant statutory and regulatory language,
respectively, throughout all the years that followed."); see also id. (noting "the tacit
approval of Congress and the Commission").
630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
6 Id. at 878.
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that the ATS, unlike the Exchange Act, applies international sub-
stantive law, and therefore should also apply international jurisdic-
tional law."7 Because international jurisdictional law has evolved to
authorize extraterritoriality, so too should the ATS. The reasoning
is, at bottom, the same as with the early piracy cases: there is no or
minimal concern about conflicts of laws since the ATS implements
an international substantive norm agreed upon by other nations."'
,' For an even more fundamental distinction, see Dodge, supra note 168, at 37 (ar-
guing that because the ATS is a jurisdictional statute, the international law sought to
be applied should be treated the same way foreign law is treated in a conflict-of-laws
case, and no prescriptive jurisdiction limitations apply at all). My thoughts on the
benefits and limitations of this view are set out immediately below, infra note 318.
318 For this conflict-of-laws point in the specific context of the ATS, see id. at 45-46
(noting that the presumption is inapplicable to the ATS because "the United States
applies not its own law but rules of customary international law binding on all na-
tions"). I agree that where international law provides liability, U.S. courts basically
exercise "the same kind of jurisdiction that courts exercise in conflict-of-laws cases
when they apply law that is not made by their own sovereign to parties over whom
they have personal jurisdiction." Id. at 37. The heuristic value of the analogy runs out,
however, where international law does not itself provide for liability or courts resort
to federal common-law rules. It may be that in conflict-of-laws cases U.S. law nomi-
nally determines whether the action based on foreign law may be brought and what
form it takes. Id. at 39. But that is a conceptual device in the conflict-of-laws discipline
designed to preserve the forum's sovereignty by not formally applying foreign law of
its own force but rather crafting local law to allow the foreign cause of action. See
Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersection Be-
tween Public and Private International Law, 76 Am. J. Int'l L. 280, 281 (1982). Yet,
however one conceptualizes the applicable law, the fact remains that U.S. courts
would not impose liability in a case alleging a foreign cause of action under foreign
law if no liability existed under that foreign law. See Day & Zimmerman, Inc. v. Chal-
loner, 423 U.S. 3, 3-5 (1975) (per curiam) (explaining that under the applicable choice
of law rule, where the harm occurred in Cambodia, Cambodian substantive law re-
quiring fault to be proved controlled, as opposed to the U.S. forum's rule of strict li-
ability), cited in Sosa, 542 U.S. at 706. The same should be true of international law
under the ATS.
I am also inclined to think that analogizing to conflict of laws for any international
law violation would render the doctrine of universal jurisdiction empty in important
respects, since the overwhelming majority of international law violations do not give
rise to universal jurisdiction. My concern is that wholesale analogy to conflict of laws
in the way Dodge proposes would therefore make all international law violations sub-
ject to universal jurisdiction by any state-not just those typically deemed universal
jurisdiction violations-thereby gutting the concept of universal jurisdiction. Dodge
argues that universal jurisdiction nonetheless would survive, because it relates to
"statutes passed to enforce" international law as opposed to direct application of in-
ternational law by courts. Dodge, supra note 168, at 43 ("When a court applies cus-
tomary international law directly, rather than a statute incorporating that law, no ba-
sis for jurisdiction to prescribe is necessary."). Yet, as he acknowledges, some legal
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And there is no or minimal concern about jurisdictional overreach
because other nations similarly have agreed upon expansive juris-
diction over the violations in question."'
A significant consequence of this thesis for the ATS is that it
supports the view that international law, not federal common law,
supplies the operative rule of decision in ATS cases.2° If this were
not so, the presumption against extraterritoriality should apply
based on the presumption's shared rationale with the Charming
Betsy canon: avoiding international discord. Unlike the application
of international law, extraterritorial application of purely federal
common-law rules could potentially conflict with foreign nations'
laws within their own territories. Further, U.S. jurisdiction over
foreign activity would be smaller over offenses against only U.S.
municipal law, as opposed to over offenses against international
systems provide for direct incorporation of international law, while others do not. Id.
But the question of whether legislation is needed to incorporate international law into
a domestic rule of decision is a matter of a state's internal law, not international law
itself. See Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 31-33 (5th ed. 1998).
And if that is right, then international law should not treat states differently by plac-
ing precincts on one type of domestic implementation of its norms (via statute applied
by courts) versus another (via direct judicial application). Finally, allowing U.S. courts
to entertain suits brought for any international law violation, even those for which in-
ternational law itself does not impose individual liability, is in tension with the Su-
preme Court's warnings in Sosa that the ATS's "jurisdictional grant is best read as
having been enacted on the understanding that the common law would provide a
cause of action for the modest number of international law violations with a potential
for personal liability at the time," 542 U.S. at 724, as opposed to those that "'are prin-
cipally incident to whole states or nations,' and not individuals seeking relief in
court." Id. at 720 (quoting Blackstone, supra note 221, at *68).
319 Again, courts would need to take account of international jurisdictional law,
which protects against "unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of
other nations," F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 164
(2004), which heeds Sosa's statement that "craft[ing] remedies [under the ATS] for
the violation of new norms of international law would raise risks of adverse foreign
policy consequences, [and therefore].., should be undertaken, if at all, with great
caution." Sosa, 542 U.S. at 727-28.
320 For an excellent articulation and defense of this view, see Keitner, supra note 271,
at 73-83. I should note that I am not taking a stance here on how best to conceptual-
ize the rule of decision, for example, whether it is international law itself or federal
common law reflecting international law. The relevant point for my purposes is that
international law provides the operative rule of decision, whether one conceptualizes
the court's application of that rule as an application of international law itself or of
federal common law incorporating or reflecting international law. For an insightful
analysis of the possibilities here, see Ingrid Wuerth, The Alien Tort Statute and Fed-
eral Common Law: A New Approach, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1931, 1935-38 (2010).
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law incorporated into U.S. law, which might be subject to universal
jurisdiction.32 '
Thus if courts were to use federal common-law rules of, say, sec-
ondary liability for foreign human rights abuses,322 those rules could
conflict with foreign rules operative within foreign territory,
thereby provoking international discord. As the Second Circuit re-
cently put it, "Unilaterally recognizing new norms of customary in-
ternational law-that is, norms that have not been universally ac-
cepted by the rest of the civilized world-would potentially create
friction in our relations with foreign nations and, therefore, would
contravene the international comity the statute was enacted to
promote."" Consequently, the presumption against extraterritori-
ality should kick in. However, if courts use international law rules
of secondary liability,324 those rules by nature have been accepted
by other nations, thereby eliminating or substantially reducing the
potential for conflicts of laws and resulting international friction.
Similarly, while the United States cannot extend uniquely U.S.
laws to activity abroad without certain specifically-recognized U.S.
connections under jurisdictional principles of international law, the
United States can extend-via laws like the ATS-international
321 Michael Ramsey makes this point in a recent article evaluating the reach of the
ATS under the Charming Betsy canon. He explains that
U.S. courts cannot, consistent with international law, use purely domestic U.S.
law-such as U.S. tort law-to impose aiding and abetting liability (contrary to
what many plaintiffs and commentators have argued and what some judges
have concluded).... [And] even if the investor's conduct arguably violates in-
ternational law, U.S. courts cannot prescribe a remedy unless it is within the
subset of international law violations subject to universal jurisdiction.
Ramsey, supra note 271, at 273. Because Ramsey evaluates the ATS only under the
Charming Betsy canon, he finds limits only with respect to non-U.S. defendants since,
under the customary international law Charming Betsy uses to construe statutes, the
United States can regulate conduct by its own nationals or entities abroad. But if my
thesis is correct, then the presumption against extraterritoriality would also eliminate
the extraterritorial application of U.S. domestic doctrines to any activity abroad,
whether committed by foreign or U.S. defendants.
... See, e.g., Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 284-91 (2d Cir. 2007)
(Hall, J., concurring); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 964-78 (9th Cir. 2002)
(Reinhardt, J., concurring).
3
'2Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2010).
... See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258-59
(2d Cir. 2009) (explaining that "the scope of liability for ATS violations should be de-
rived from international law" and using "international law to find the standard for ac-
cessorial liability").
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rules of liability to universal jurisdiction offenses without any U.S.
connection at all.325
Of course, taken to the extreme this whole line of argument
might be read to suggest that the ATS is essentially a dead letter
because the international norms sought to be enforced under the
statute generally impose criminal, not civil, liability,3 26 and the
ATS's distinctiveness in providing a civil remedy may give rise to
distinctive frictions with foreign nations.3 27 The Supreme Court and
the statute's history and language halt that slippery slope, however.
The Court made clear in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain that the ATS is
not a dead letter or mere "jurisdictional convenience to be placed
on the shelf for use by a future Congress... to make some element
of the law of nations actionable for the benefit of foreigners. 3 28 To
be sure, the Court viewed favorably lower court decisions applying
the ATS to suits alleging serious human rights abuses prohibited
under international criminal law.29 Furthermore, as a historical
matter, the law of nations at the time the ATS was enacted
"linked" criminal sanctions and civil remedies,330 requiring nations
to redress injuries by their nationals either through criminal prose-
325 Ramsey, supra note 271, at 273, 283-84, 297-300.
311 See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 151-53 (Leval, J., concurring in the judgment).
327 For example, as Hannah Buxbaum rightly observes,
even if a transnational case involves a shared substantive norm, using domestic
law as the vehicle for its application carries with it associated norms that are not
shared. Some of these are procedural. For instance, litigation before a U.S.
court will involve processes for the discovery of evidence, or the examination of
witnesses, that might differ substantially from such processes in other countries.
This problem surfaces in all U.S. civil litigation involving international ele-
ments, including public law cases brought under the Alien Tort Claims Act.
Buxbaum, supra note 39, at 296.
I agree that while these remain significant and valid objections, there are signs of
long-term convergence. Id. at 296-97. U.S. courts also have at their disposal other
mechanisms to dismiss cases based on these concerns, such as flexible doctrines of
personal jurisdiction, see Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115
(1987), and forum non conveniens, see Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 & n.6
(1981).
.. 542 U.S. 692, 719 (2004).
329 Id. at 732 (noting that the Court's approach is "consistent with the reasoning of
many of the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this Court" and
citing specifically Filartiga's statement that "[f]or purposes of civil liability, the tor-
turer has become-like the pirate and the slave trader before him-hostis humani
generis, an enemy of all mankind").
330 Id. at 723-24.
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cution, extradition, or civil redress.33' Because of jurisdictional rules
at the time, "[i]n certain instances, a civil remedy was the only
available means of redress. 33 2 Finally, requiring international law
specifically to impose civil liability would ignore the text of the
ATS itself, which expressly provides "jurisdiction of any civil ac-
tion.., for a tort only." '333 Read sympathetically in light of prece-
dent and history, the question of civil liability is thus not something
courts necessarily need to determine; the ATS itself resolves that
issue. The statute does not, however, resolve the choice of law be-
tween federal common-law rules and international law. It is here
that courts do have to make a determination and, under Charming
Betsy, should be careful about conflicts with foreign law and juris-
dictional overreaching.
The much-publicized South African apartheid litigation offers a
good illustration. Large classes of South African plaintiffs brought
suit under the ATS alleging a variety of multinational corporations,
including both U.S. and non-U.S. entities, aided and abetted inter-
national law violations by the South African government during
the apartheid era.3" The case worked its way up to the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit on the issue of whether aiding
and abetting liability was even actionable under the ATS to begin
with. The Second Circuit held that "a plaintiff may plead a theory
of aiding and abetting liability" under the statute and remanded to
the district court.335 On remand, the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York had to decide, among other things,
whether the statute applied extraterritorially, and what law-U.S.
municipal law (that is, federal common law) or international law-
provided the applicable rule of decision in ATS cases.
On the first issue, the district court found that the presumption
against extraterritoriality did not apply because
[t]he AT[S] does not by its own terms regulate conduct; rather it
applies universal norms that forbid conduct regardless of territo-
rial demarcations or sovereign prerogatives. Therefore, unlike
3 Bellia & Clark, supra note 24, at 9.
332 Id.
3" 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (emphasis added).
3 In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 241-43 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
... Khulumani v. Barclay Nat'l Bank, 504 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2007).
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the application of specific rules formulated by American legisla-
tors or jurists, the adjudication of tort claims stemming from acts
committed abroad will not generate conflicting legal obligations,
and there is a substantially reduced likelihood that adjudication
will legitimately offend the sovereignty of foreign nations. 36
In short, and in line with this Article's thesis, the court reasoned
that because the ATS acts as a vehicle for the enforcement of uni-
versally applicable international norms, there is no conflict of laws
and no jurisdictional overreaching. This feature therefore erased
core concerns behind the presumption against extraterritoriality,
rendering it inapplicable to the ATS.
This feature also guided the court's resolution of the choice-of-
law question on whether international law or federal common law
governed aiding and abetting liability under the ATS. As one
might suspect, the court held that international law provided the
applicable law, reiterating that, "As the AT[S] is merely a jurisdic-
tional vehicle for the enforcement of universal norms, the contours
of secondary liability must stem from international sources." '337 In-
deed, in the court's view, to look beyond international law "consti-
tutes impermissible judicial policing. 338
So far, the court's analysis comports nicely with this Article's
thesis. Because international law supplies the applicable law, the
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply. The reason
is that application of international substantive law generates no
conflicts with foreign law and application of international jurisdic-
tional law creates no jurisdictional overreaching.
Unfortunately, the court did not heed its own rule. Addressing
the applicable law on corporate alter ego and agency later in the
opinion, the court hedged on its insistence that international law
provides the applicable law for the ATS. It began by stating that
"[a]lthough the AT[S] requires this Court to apply customary in-
ternational law whenever possible, it is necessary to rely on federal
common law in limited instances in order to fill gaps."3 9 Once that
336 S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 246-47.
311 Id. at 256.
311 Id. at 256 & n.139.
139 Id. at 270.
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move is made, however, rationales favoring the presumption
against extraterritoriality rush back into the picture.
As to alter ego, the court simply concluded that U.S. corporate
veil-piercing doctrines applied to foreign subsidiaries." ° With re-
spect to agency, the court candidly acknowledged that "the inter-
national law of agency has not developed precise standards for this
court to apply," and "[t]herefore, I will apply federal common law
principles concerning agency."1 The court even applied these fed-
eral common-law doctrines to relationships between non-U.S. sub-
sidiary and parent entities acting outside the United States.42 This
application of uniquely U.S. law under the ATS flatly contradicted
the court's prior descriptions of the ATS as "merely a jurisdictional
vehicle for the enforcement of universal norms" 3 and the court's
resulting assuagement that "[t]herefore, unlike the application of
specific rules formulated by American legislators or jurists," apply-
ing the ATS to foreign conduct would not create conflicts of laws
or U.S. jurisdictional overreaching.'
But federal common-law rules of the sort the court applied are
paradigmatically "specific rules formulated by American... ju-
rists." '345 Application of these rules therefore could conflict with
foreign laws, leading to international discord. In addition, and es-
pecially when applied to non-U.S. entities outside the United
340 Id. at 270-71.
'41 Id. at 271.
32 Id. at 275 (applying U.S. agency principles to Daimler, noting that "Daimler al-
legedly oversaw all operations at the plant producing Mercedes cars in South Africa,
and management in Germany was aware of and directly involved in the activities ma-
terial to the Complaint").
3 Id. at 256.
',, Id. at 247. 1 am also not convinced that international law is relevant only for the
conduct-regulating rule but not for determining who can be liable. See Wuerth, supra
note 320, at 1961 ("The effort ... to distinguish 'conduct-regulating' norms on the one
hand (to which international law would apply), from the type of defendant involved
on the other hand (to which domestic law would apply), is not fully convincing. For
example, international law seems indisputably relevant to the question of whether
private actors as a group can be held liable-no one appears to argue that corpora-
tions can be held directly liable for conduct such as torture that is only actionable
when engaged in by state actors. So, in broad terms at least, international law deter-
mines the kind of defendant to whom liability can be attributed. Similarly, if interna-
tional criminal law and tribunals did impose sanctions on corporations as they do on
private individuals, it is hard to see why this would not work in favor of imposing ATS
liability on corporations." (footnotes omitted)).
3 5S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d at 247.
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States, the extraterritorial application of federal common law could
produce jurisdictional overreaching beyond the limits set by inter-
national law, potentially creating another source of friction with
foreign nations.346
Taken in combination and buttressed by the Supreme Court's
muscular reinvigoration of the presumption against extraterritori-
ality in Morrison, these concerns set up a clear division for ATS
cases that highlights this Article's central thesis. If courts apply in-
ternational law under the ATS, the relevant canon of construction
regarding extraterritoriality is Charming Betsy. As the district court
in the apartheid litigation observed, application of international
law reduces the potential for both conflicts with foreign law and ju-
risdictional overreaching. As the court failed to appreciate later in
that same opinion, however, if courts apply uniquely U.S. law-
such as federal common law on corporate veil piercing or agency-
concerns about conflicts with foreign law and jurisdictional over-
reaching rematerialize and risk international discord, justifying the
presumption against extraterritoriality for the ATS. Indeed, by us-
ing uniquely federal common-law rules as the applicable law the
ATS becomes indistinguishable from the Exchange Act, and Mor-
rison's reinvigorated presumption would appear to control.
2. Charming Betsy and Extraterritoriality
Another important consequence of the thesis given current on-
going litigation in lower courts is that if international law supplies
the applicable law in ATS cases, conduct by foreigners against for-
eigners abroad that is subject to universal jurisdiction is actionable
under the statute. But if the conduct does not qualify for universal
jurisdiction, applying the ATS could violate jurisdictional princi-
ples of international law and run afoul of Charming Betsy. Profes-
sor Michael Ramsey has identified this as a limitation on investor-
liability claims of the sort alleged in the apartheid litigation.347 He
346 It should also be noted that the Second Circuit recently found that "the liability of
corporations for the actions of their employees or agents is not a question of remedy.
Corporate liability imposes responsibility for the actions of a culpable individual on a
wholly new defendant-the corporation.... [C]orporate liability is akin to accessorial
liability...." Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 147-48 (2d Cir.
2010).
3,7Ramsey, supra note 271, at 305, 318-20.
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emphasizes that "international consensus on misconduct is not suf-
ficient to impose U.S. liability on non-U.S. defendants for non-U.S.
conduct. Rather, under principles of prescriptive jurisdiction, a
plaintiff should be required to show both that international law
proscribes the conduct and that international law grants universal
jurisdiction to redress the conduct."' Ramsey disputes the exis-
tence of universal jurisdiction over secondary investor liability un-
der international law, an issue I want to put aside as already having
garnered attention in the literature, 9 but he clearly thinks-and I
agree-that U.S. courts can extend the ATS to foreign actors
abroad for universal jurisdiction offenses under international law. 5
I focus here instead on another growing area of ATS litigation
that has not attracted such attention in the literature35' but that
promises to supply an increasing stream of suits: terrorism. Like
the piracy cases of old,"2 and now also of new, 53 courts are strug-
gling with the scope and definition of this category of offense.
Somewhat ironically given the post-9/11 "war on terror," while
courts have been accused of too loosely deriving international rules
of corporate liability for human rights abuses, and in turn too
broadly expanding the scope of U.S. jurisdiction in relation to
these offenses,5 4 courts have skeptically and restrictively inter-
preted U.S. jurisdiction over acts of terrorism. Yet these offenses
promise to form the basis of an increasing number of ATS claims,
not least because it appears that one offense in particular-
financing terrorism-may be one of the lone offenses giving rise to
corporate liability under the ATS going forward, at least according
to the Second Circuit's recent decision in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co."' Before explaining why, I want to disagree with,
and offer a methodologically sounder alternative to, decisions re-
-'4' Id. at 319.
39 Id.
350 Id.
351 See Steven R. Swanson, Terrorism, Piracy, and the Alien Tort Statute, 40 Rutgers
L.J. 159, 161 (2008).
352 See United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820); United States v.
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610
(1818).
181 United States v. Said, No. 2:10cr57, 2010 WL 389361 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2010)
(memorandum and opinion order on Defendants' Joint Motion to Dismiss).
114 See generally Bellinger, supra note 291; Ramsey, supra note 271.
... 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010).
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strictively interpreting U.S. jurisdiction over terrorist offenses
abroad.
a. Acts of Terrorism
The main culprit is a 2003 decision by the Second Circuit, United
States v. Yousef."6 Just as Chief Justice Marshall tried in Klintock to
atrophy his decision in Palmer to extend U.S. laws against piracy to
the full extent of international law, lower courts are right now try-
ing to atrophy Yousef in order to extend U.S. laws against terror-
ism to the full extent of international law: namely, universally. The
ultimate success of these attempts holds important implications for
the reach of both criminal and civil statutes over terrorist acts
abroad. As to the latter in particular, a number of ATS cases in-
volving claims against foreign institutions for financing terrorist ac-
tivity are gaining traction in the lower courts. Whether courts suc-
cessfully can eschew Yousef s universal jurisdiction holding and
methodology will decide whether the cases will move forward. Let
me propose a way.
In Yousef, the Second Circuit considered whether Ramzi
Yousef, one of the 1993 World Trade Center bombers, could be
prosecuted under U.S. law for planting and exploding a bomb on a
Philippines commercial airliner flying from the Philippines to Ja-
pan.357 The explosion killed a Japanese citizen and seriously injured
other passengers,35 but no evidence suggested U.S. citizens were
onboard the flight or were targets of the bomb.359 The relevant
count charged Yousef under U.S. law implementing the Montreal
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the
Safety of Civil Aviation,3" codified principally at 18 U.S.C.
§ 32(b).361 The statute has an explicitly extraterritorial scope, so the
court did not apply the presumption against extraterritoriality.362
With respect to the international law analysis, the Southern Dis-
356 327 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2003).
311 Id. at 81, 85.
... Id. at 81.
... Id. at 97.
360 Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 565, 974 U.N.T.S. 177 [hereinafter Montreal Conven-
tion].
361 Yousef, 327 F.3d at 89-90.
112 Id. at 88.
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trict of New York held application of U.S. law proper on the the-
ory that Yousef's acts constituted terrorism subject to universal ju-
risdiction under customary international law.363
On appeal, Yousef challenged the district court's holding, argu-
ing that "terrorism" could not be subject to universal jurisdiction
because it has no commonly agreed-upon definition under interna-
tional law.3" The Second Circuit took up this argument and
plunged into a critique of how courts should discern international
law and, under such standards, why "terrorism" does not qualify as
a universal jurisdiction offense. 365 The danger in the court's analysis
of the offense at issue-plane bombing-was ultimately avoided in
Yousef because the court was able to resort to the positive law of
the Convention and its domestic implementing legislation instead
of custom. But Yousefs holding and methodology has bled into
other areas," and the court's analysis poses significant hurdles for
future courts faced with different facts or law under Charming
Betsy and threatens to block full implementation of U.S. jurisdic-
tion over terrorist acts abroad under international law.
The Second Circuit began by chiding the district court's reliance
on the Restatement as a source for identifying what crimes are sub-
ject to universal jurisdiction.6 The panel was clearly correct that,
notwithstanding Story's opinion in Smith, the writings of scholars
are not a primary source for discerning the content of international
law.3' But the Second Circuit then ignored, in its own universal ju-
risdiction analysis, the most obvious and germane primary source
before it: the Montreal Convention. The Convention proscribes
plane bombing in terms essentially identical to 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)369
and provides the treaty-based equivalent of universal jurisdiction
over this specific crime.37° The Convention then goes further, com-
363 United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
Yousef, 327 F.3d at 97, 103.
Id. at 98-108.31 See, e.g., Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257,280 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
367 Yousef, 327 F.3d at 99-103.
36 Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(d), 59 Stat.
1031 (describing "the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various
nations, as subsidiary means for determination of rules of law").
361 See 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3) (2006); Montreal Convention, supra note 360, art.
1(1 (c)
Montreal Convention, supra note 360, art. 5 ("Each Contracting State shall likewise
take such measures as may be necessary to establish its jurisdiction over the offences
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manding states parties to exercise jurisdiction where the offender is
found in their territories and they do not extradite, irrespective of
any other jurisdictional link.37' This international obligation applies
regardless of whether the crime occurred in the territory of a state
312party or a non-state party.
Through these expansive jurisdictional provisions, this extremely
widely ratified treaty3 73 effectively generalized its prohibitions to
every state in the world. The only other way to view its provisions
would be to say that states parties agreed to apply the treaty prohi-
bitions retroactively to individuals for conduct committed in a non-
state party just because a state party happened to get hold of the
offender at some later point. But that reading runs directly against
fundamental notions of due process and legality accepted by the
world's major legal systems by applying a law to an individual that
did not govern his conduct when he engaged in it (in the non-state
party) ."'
The better view is that the overwhelming majority of states cre-
ated, not only as a matter of positive law, but also through wide-
spread acceptance and implementation of the treaty's generalizable
rules, a customary norm against plane bombing. And, like piracy,
perpetrators of this crime can be prosecuted by any state that gains
custody over them. In short, the Montreal Convention is quintes-
sentially what the Second Circuit recently called in the ATS con-
text a "law-making" treaty,375 or treaty of customary "norm-
creating character. 3 76 Incidentally, resort to treaties as generators
mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 1 (a), (b) and (c)... in the case where the alleged of-
fender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him .. "). This basis of jurisdic-
tion is also reflected in the U.S. Code. See 18 U.S.C. § 32(b)(4) (providing jurisdiction
where "an offender is afterwards found in the United States").
171 Montreal Convention, supra note 360, art. 7 ("The Contracting State in the terri-
tory of which the alleged offender is found shall, if it does not extradite him, be
obliged, without exception whatsoever and whether or not the offence was committed
in its territory, to submit the case to its competent authorities for the purpose of
prosecution.").
372 Id.
173 At the time of this writing, the Convention has 189 states parties, and therefore has
been ratified by almost every nation in the world. See Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S.
Dep't of State, Treaties in Force 324-25 (Jan. 1, 2010), available at http://www.state.gov/
documents/organization/143863.pdf [hereinafter Treaties in Force].
... These due process concerns are discussed infra Part IV.
... Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 138 (2d Cir. 2010).
... Id. at 139.
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of customary law in this respect is also a far more reliable resource
for discerning state consent than collecting the various writings of
international law scholars, as the Supreme Court had done in
Smith.3 7
Using this methodology, there was never any need in Yousef to
address whether "terrorism" is a universal crime under interna-
tional law or what that term even means. The plain and simple so-
lution to the universal jurisdiction question is that anyone who
bombs civilian aircraft or, even more specifically, "unlawfully and
intentionally.., places or causes to be placed on an aircraft in ser-
vice.., a device or substance which is likely to destroy that air-
craft, or to cause damage to it which renders it incapable of flight,
or... is likely to endanger its safety in flight 3 78 commits a universal
crime under international law. Accordingly, the United States can
prosecute that individual under international law even though the
crime was committed by a foreigner against foreigners and oc-
curred on a foreign-flag aircraft traveling between two foreign des-
tinations. In fact, the Montreal Convention not only provides for
this treaty-based version of universal jurisdiction, it also required
the United States to prosecute Yousef because the government did
not extradite him to another state party with jurisdiction.379 The
Second Circuit ironically relied on the positive law of the treaty
and its implementing legislation in this regard to uphold the con-
viction,"' while ignoring the treaty's jurisgenerative force for the
customary law of universal jurisdiction.
But reliance on the positive law of the treaty may not always be
available. It becomes more difficult, for example, if the crime were
to occur in a non-state party since, as a matter of positive law, trea-
ties do not bind non-parties. 8 ' What if instead Yousef had bombed
... See United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61, 163 n.8 (1820); cf.
United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 100-03 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing sources of in-
ternational law and pointing out that "scholars do not make law").
378 Montreal Convention, supra note 360, art. 1(1)(c).
171 Yousef, 327 F.3d at 108-09 & n.43.380 Id. at 108-10.
3' Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that "a
treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its con-
sent." Article 35 provides that treaties are only binding on non-parties where the non-
party "State expressly accepts that obligation in writing." Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties arts. 34, 35, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; see also Yousef, 327
F.3d at 96 (explaining that a treaty is "binding only on the States that accede to it").
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the plane in Russia, one of the few remaining nations not to have
ratified the Montreal Convention?382 As a matter of purely positive
law, it is hard to extend the treaty's proscriptions into a state that
has not agreed to it.83 Again, the sounder analysis is that the
United States has jurisdiction under customary law, evidenced in
the treaty's substantive prohibitions and broad jurisdictional provi-
sions consented to by the vast majority of states in the world, creat-
ing a generalizable prohibition on the specific act of plane bomb-
ing-not abstractly "terrorism"-and authorizing jurisdiction over
perpetrators wherever they are found.
Another problem for Yousefs cramped reading is that U.S. stat-
utes over international law violations may not always implement
treaties, let alone ones that explicitly provide extraterritorial juris-
diction. Again, a prime example is the ATS.3 Foreign victims of
terrorist acts like those in Yousef who bring suit under the ATS
would need to rely on customary international law, not treaty
law.385 While the Montreal Convention makes such acts "viola-
tion[s] of the law of nations"386 subject to expansive jurisdiction, the
treaty itself is quiet on civil liability.87 Other equally-condemned
acts of terrorism proscribed in widely ratified treaties and subject
to expansive jurisdiction include hijacking," bombing public
places,389 and hostage taking." And, as noted already, a major
source of recent ATS litigation has been claims against foreign in-
... See Treaties in Force, supra note 373, at 324-25.
3' See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, No. 2:10cr56, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115746, at
*104 (E.D. Va. Oct. 29, 2010) (noting that failure to ratify UNCLOS would bar appli-
cation against United States as treaty law).
8428 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
385 See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 269 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Nei-
ther the Almog nor the Afriat-Kurtzer plaintiffs assert that the torts they allege are in
violation of a treaty of the United States; rather, they assert a violation of the law of
nations.").
.. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
See Montreal Convention, supra note 360.
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft arts. 1, 4(2), 7,
Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105 [hereinafter Seizure of Aircraft Con-
vention].
389 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings arts. 1, 2,
6(4), Dec. 15, 1997, 116 Stat. 721, 2149 U.N.T.S. 256 [hereinafter Bombing Conven-
tion].
"' International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages arts. 1, 5(2), 8(1), Dec.
17, 1979, T.I.A.S. 11081, 1316 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Hostage Convention].
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stitutions for financing terrorist activity abroad.39" ' If, as Yousef
would have it, none of this foreign terrorist activity is subject to
universal jurisdiction under customary international law, then none
of it is actionable under the ATS.
This has not escaped defense attorneys in ATS cases." Lower
courts adjudicating these types of terrorism-related claims have
pushed back against Yousef s restrictiveness and, along the lines of
the critique of Yousef above, have relied on treaties to identify cus-
tomary international law norms against specifically defined terror-
ist acts-not some abstract, protean crime of "terrorism." '393 Courts
have done so to show that the offenses meet the Supreme Court's
test in Sosa for which torts in violation of the law of nations are ac-
tionable under the ATS.394 According to Sosa, "courts should re-
quire any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-
century paradigms" like piracy.9
Plane bombing and other specifically-defined acts of terrorism
like those listed above rest on a norm of international character
overwhelmingly recognized by the civilized world: the vast majority
of nations have ratified treaties prohibiting the acts,396 requiring
municipal implementation of the prohibitions, and authorizing
the broad exercise of jurisdiction.9 These modern terrorism of-
fenses are also defined with specificity comparable to the eight-
eenth-century paradigms like piracy.
'3 See Lev v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 08 CV 3251 (NG) (VVP), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
16887, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010); Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257,
at *261 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
'9' See Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 280 (describing ATS defendant's reliance on Yousef
for this argument).
'9' See id. at 280-81.
4542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
395 Id.
"'Treaties in Force, supra note 373, at 462-63. One hundred and sixty-four nations
have ratified the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.
Id.
" Bombing Convention, supra note 389, art. 6; Hostage Convention, supra note
390, art. 2; Seizure of Aircraft Convention, supra note 388, art. 2.
3' Bombing Convention, supra note 389, art. 6; Hostage Convention, supra note
390, art. 5; Seizure of Aircraft Convention, supra note 388, art. 4.
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Indeed, thanks to treaties these terrorism offenses are more spe-
cifically defined. We saw already the untidiness of the definition of
piracy under the law of nations in the early cases, and Justice
Story's heroic efforts to cull as settled and precise a definition as
possible from various writings of publicists: "whatever may be the
diversity of definitions, in other respects," Story concluded, "all
writers concur, in holding, that robbery, or forcible depredations
upon the sea, animo furandi, is piracy."3" Compare that general
definition with specifically detailed definitions of modern terrorism
offenses elaborated in widely ratified multilateral treaties."° Again,
the treaties are not themselves what ATS plaintiffs rely upon; 0
rather, they make up the best evidence of what constitutes an of-
fense against the law of nations and the definition of that offense. °
b. Corporate A TS Liability for Financing Terrorism
In this connection, the International Convention for the Sup-
pression of the Financing of Terrorism 3 provides a critically im-
portant resource for ATS suits going forward. The Second Circuit
recently held that because international law does not directly im-
pose liability on corporations for human rights abuses, no corpo-
rate liability exists under the ATS.4° Yet with respect to financing
terrorism, international law does authorize corporate liability. Ap-
plying the methodology above to an actual ATS case alleging fi-
nancing terrorism reveals why.
In Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, both U.S. and non-U.S. plaintiffs
claimed that, among other things, Arab Bank financed terrorist
acts in the Middle East by collecting funds and donations the Bank
knew were being used to bankroll suicide bombings and other ter-
rorist attacks and by administering payments to the families of
"martyrs" who killed themselves in the bombings.0 5 While U.S.
3" United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153,161-62 (1820).
'Bombing Convention, supra note 389, art. 2; Hostage Convention, supra note
390, art. 1; Seizure of Aircraft Convention, supra note 388, art. 1.
40! See Almog v. Arab Bank, PLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 257, 269-70 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
41 Colangelo, supra note 273, at 169-72.
40' International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism arts.
4, 5, G.A. Res. 54/109, U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (Dec. 9, 1999) [hereinafter Financing
Convention].
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 148-49 (2d Cir. 2010).
4" 471 F. Supp. 2d. at 260-63.
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plaintiffs brought suit under the Anti-Terrorism Act ("ATA"),4
aliens used the aptly-named ATS.' Other recent ATS cases by
foreigners mirror these claims.'
To discern whether financing the attacks met Sosa's test, and
like the customary international law analysis above (but unlike
Yousef), the court looked directly to the jurisgenerative force of
treaties.' The plaintiffs in Almog claimed three types of violation
of the law of nations: (1) aiding and abetting genocide, (2) aiding
and abetting crimes against humanity, and (3) aiding and abetting
and directly financing terrorist attacks.""° What makes the third
category of terrorism violations attractive ATS claims is that,
unlike genocide, plaintiffs need not prove genocidal "intent to de-
stroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group, as such." 'x And unlike crimes against humanity, plaintiffs
need not show "a widespread or systematic attack. 4 12 Yet despite
these advantages, the third category of offenses ran straight into
Yousef s doctrinal blockade that "terrorism" is not a universal of-
fense because it lacks a commonly agreed upon definition in inter-
national law. Unsurprisingly, and relying specifically on Yousef,
this is precisely the argument defendant Arab Bank made in Al-
mog.
413
18 U.S.C. §§ 2331, 2333-38 (2006); Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 260.
'Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 260.
4" See Lev v. Arab Bank, PLC, No. 08 CV 3251 (NG) (VVP), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16887, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 2010) ("[T]he allegations of the complaint in
this case largely mirror those of the Almog and Afriat-Kurtzer actions involved in the
Almog decision, although the allegations in this case are limited to violations of the
ATS and do not include violations of the Anti-Terrorism Act." (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 273; see also supra notes 373-77 and accompanying
text.
':Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 264-65.
'" Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; see also Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 276 ("The underly-
ing norm [against financing terrorist attacks] thus differs from the genocide norm with
respect to the purpose of the perpetrators. .. .
4 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 7, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; see also Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 275-76.
,
3 Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 280 ("[Defendant Arab Bank] argues that the underlying
suicide bombings and other murderous acts alleged in Count Three, which it says are
'commonly referred to as terrorism,' cannot be a violation of the law of nations because
there is no consensus on the meaning of 'terrorism.' In support of its argument, Arab Bank
relies on United States v. Yousef.. .. " (internal citation omitted)).
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In response, the court resorted to treaties as generators of cus-
tomary international law. It explained that, "in this case, there is no
need to resolve any definitional disputes as to the scope of the
word 'terrorism,' for the Conventions expressing the international
norm provide their own specific descriptions of the conduct con-
demned."4"4 Because "[t]hese authoritative sources establish that
the specific conduct alleged-organized, systematic suicide bomb-
ings and other murderous attacks on innocent civilians intended to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population-are universally con-
demned," the claims were actionable under the ATS. '15 The court
made clear that treaties "themselves evidence state practice" nec-
essary to form a customary norm.4"6 That is, "treaties evidence the
'customs and practices' of the States that ratify them. This is so be-
cause ratification of a treaty that embodies specific norms of con-
duct evidences a State's acceptance of the norms as legal obliga-
tions." '7 And the treaties evidenced a specific definition of the
offense: "Here, the international sources specifically articulate a
universal standard that condemns the conduct alleged."4 '8 More-
over, the Financing and Bombing Conventions require implement-
ing legislation by states parties, '19 adding another layer of state
practice."'
As to the precise claims against Arab Bank, both the Financing
and Bombing Conventions also provide for secondary liability42" ' (as
4 Id.
415 Id. at 281; see also id. ("[R]egardless of whether there is universal agreement as
to the precise scope of the word 'terrorism,' the conduct involved here is specifically




4gFinancing Convention, supra note 403, arts. 4, 5.; Bombing Convention, supra
note 389, art. 4.42
°Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 273.
421 See Financing Convention, supra note 403, art. 2(5) ("Any person also commits
an offence if that person: (a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in
paragraph 1 or 4 of this article; (b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offense
as set forth in paragraph 1 or 4 of this article; (c) Contributes to the commission of
one or more offences as set forth in paragraphs 1 or 4 of this article by a group of per-
sons acting with a common purpose. Such contribution shall be intentional and shall
either: (i) Be made with the aim of furthering the criminal activity or criminal purpose
of the group, where such activity or purpose involves the commission of an offence as
set forth in paragraph 1 of this article; or (ii) Be made in the knowledge of the intention
[Vol. 97:10191100
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do U.S. laws implementing these conventions).422 Plaintiffs further
alleged a primary violation of the law of nations based on the in-
ternational prohibition in the Financing Convention, which prohib-
its "by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully,
provid[ing] or collect[ing] funds with the intention that they should
be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in
part, in order to carry out" an act constituting an offense under the
treaties listed in the Financing Convention's annex,4 3 which in-
cludes the Bombing Convention.42" Plaintiffs thus could rely on
of the group to commit an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 of this article."); Bombing
Convention, supra note 389, art. 2(3) ("Any person also commits an offence if that
person: (a) Participates as an accomplice in an offence as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2
of the present article; or (b) Organizes or directs others to commit an offense as set
forth in paragraph 1 or 2 of the present article; or (c) In any other way contributes to
the commission of one or more offences as set forth in paragraph 1 or 2 of the present
article by a group of persons acting with a common purpose; such contribution shall
be intentional and either be made with the aim of furthering the general criminal ac-
tivity or purpose of the group or be made in the knowledge of the intention of the
group to commit the offence or offences concerned.").
422 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332f, 2339C (2006).
'2 Financing Convention, supra note 403, art. 2.
4124 Id. annex. After it prohibits financing specific terrorist acts as defined in other
widely ratified treaties, the Financing Convention creates a catch-all receptacle for
financing "terrorism" generally defined. This has met with some resistance by at least
three of the thirty-seven Islamic states parties to the treaty. Article 2(1)(b) prohibits
directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provid[ing] or collect[ing] funds
with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to
be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out
(b) Any other act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian,
or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of
armed conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to in-
timidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organiza-
tion to do or to abstain from doing any act.
Id. art. 2. Egypt, Jordan, and Syria made declarations concerning this provision that,
to borrow from Egypt's declaration, "acts of national resistance.., including armed
resistance against foreign occupation and aggression with a view to liberation and
self-determination" do not qualify as acts of terrorism. See United Nations Multilat-
eral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General: Status as at 31 December 2005,
Vol. 2, 165, 166, 169 (2006) (Declarations of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria). A large num-
ber of other states parties to the treaty objected to these declarations and regarded
them as reservations that sought unilaterally to limit the scope of the convention con-
trary to its object and purpose. See id. at 170-83. (Objections of Austria, Belgium,
Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, the
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United
States).
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these conventions, not themselves as sources of private rights of ac-
tion, but as powerful evidence of state practice and opinio juris re-
garding what the overwhelming majority of nations in the world
define as specific terrorist offenses against the law of nations."5
Finally, although it was not before the court in Almog, the Fi-
nancing Convention squarely answers the question courts now
must ask in the wake of the Second Circuit's decision in Kiobel:
does international law provide corporate liability for the offense?
The Financing Convention, embodying customary international
law, does. Article 5 commands
Each State Party, in accordance with its domestic legal principles,
shall take the necessary measures to enable a legal entity located
in its territory or organized under its laws to be held liable when
a person responsible for the management or control of that legal
entity has, in that capacity, committed an offence set forth in ar-
ticle 2. Such liability may be criminal, civil or administrative. 6
The Convention easily qualifies as what the court in Kiobel called a
"law-making" or a "norm-creating" treaty.4 27 Its provisions are in-
tended to be generalizable to all states,4 28 it is widely ratified and
requires implementing legislation by states parties,429 and the
United Nations Security Council has even called upon all states to
become parties.43°
As this Article cautioned at the outset, the law regarding extra-
territoriality contains many intricacies. This Part explored a num-
ber of them with respect to specific laws and in the context of spe-
cific cases. My overall purpose was to give fuller articulation and
illustration to the unified approach and to reveal its implications
for some of the more complicated and contentious statutory con-
struction issues courts currently face. I hope ultimately to have
425 The court also noted that U.N. Security Council Resolutions reinforce this norm.
Almog, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 279, 289 n.42; see also S.C. Res. 1566, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004); S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
126 Financing Convention, supra note 403, art. 5(1) (emphasis added).
27 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2010) (quot-
ing North Sea Continental Shelf (F.R.G. v. Den & Neth.), 1969 I.CJ. 3,42 (Feb. 20)).
Cf. supra notes 373-77 and accompanying text (applying this analysis to Montreal
Convention).
4" Financing Convention, supra note 403, arts. 4-5.
131 S.C. Res. 1373, art. 3(d), U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001).
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shown that the approach better effectuates legislative intent than a
blanket presumption against extraterritoriality by looking to the
nature of the legislative source behind a law for the appropriate
canon of construction, better avoids unintended discord with for-
eign nations by fully implementing international law when Con-
gress uses multilateral sources to legislate, and holds significant
implications for some of the more controversial and important ex-
traterritoriality issues of the day.
IV. DUE PROCESS
The final piece of the extraterritoriality puzzle is the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. It interlocks with constitutional
sources and statutory construction to round out the unified ap-
proach with individual rights considerations. In the interstate con-
text, Fourteenth Amendment due process has long required "that
for a State's substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally
permissible manner, that State must have a significant contact or
significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such
that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally un-
fair."43' More recently, courts have found that in the international
context, Fifth Amendment due process likewise blocks federal pro-
jections of U.S. law abroad that are "arbitrary or fundamentally
unfair."'32 What precisely the Fifth Amendment demands under
this standard varies across circuits33 (the Supreme Court has yet to
address the issue), but a leading test from the Ninth and Second
Circuits requires that "[i]n order to apply extraterritorially a fed-
eral criminal statute to a defendant consistently with due process,
there must be a sufficient nexus between the defendant and the
United States, so that such application would not be arbitrary or
431 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985) (quoting Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981)).
432 See, e.g., United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1108-09 (9th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 111-12 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. Perez-Oviedo,
281 F.3d 400, 402-03 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Suerte, 291 F.3d 366, 369-77 (5th
Cir. 2002); United States v. Cardales, 168 F.3d 548, 552-53 (1st Cir. 1999).
431 See Colangelo, supra note 12, at 162-66 (summarizing different circuits' ap-
proaches).
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fundamentally unfair." '434 Lower courts have used this nexus re-
quirement in the civil context as well.435 The implications for extra-
territoriality cases of diverse stripes are self-evident.
Recall, for instance, that the defendant in Yousef bombed a Phil-
ippines flight en route from the Philippines to Japan, killing a
Japanese citizen and injuring other passengers but that no U.S.
citizens were onboard or were targets of the bomb.437 Unsurpris-
ingly, Yousef claimed there was no U.S. nexus and, therefore, ap-
plication of U.S. law to him violated his Fifth Amendment due
process rights.438 The Second Circuit acknowledged Yousef's Fifth
Amendment rights, but rejected his claim, finding that because the
bombing was a "test-run" for a larger plot against U.S. aircraft, the
nexus requirement was satisfied.439 Thus, had the bombing not been
a rehearsal for a plot against U.S. aircraft, Yousef presumably
would have succeeded on his due process claim. The Fifth
Amendment hurdle consequently would have blocked the United
States from prosecuting a plane bomber in U.S. custody in direct
contravention of U.S. obligations under the Montreal Conven-
tion.' Once again, Yousefs precedential shadow looms long and is
a cause for concern.
Defendants in civil suits have also advanced these due process
claims. In Goldberg v. UBS AG, relatives of a non-U.S. victim
killed in a terrorist bombing in Israel brought suit under the ATA,
alleging UBS had, among other things, financed terrorism." UBS
resisted application of U.S. law on Fifth Amendment grounds, ar-
guing that the conduct at issue had no nexus to the United States."2
The district court took an even more elastic view of the nexus re-
quirement than the Second Circuit had in Yousef, stretching it to
touch the United States's general interest in suppressing interna-
"United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248-49 (9th Cir. 1990) (internal citation
omitted); see also Yousef, 327 F.3d at 111 (quoting Davis, 905 F.2d at 248-49).
... Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 105-06 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
436 Yousef, 327 F.3d at 79.
437Id. at 97.438 Id. at 111.
411 Id. at 112.
" Montreal Convention, supra note 360, arts. 5, 7.
660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 414,434 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
442 Id. at 431.
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tional terrorism,"3 effectively nullifying the requirement for claims
involving any terrorist act anywhere in the world. On reconsidera-
tion, the court tried to fortify this link with other independently
anemic links, like the fact that UBS has offices in New York,' a
contact far more relevant for establishing general personal jurisdic-
tion for the forum's courts, as opposed to justifying application of
the forum's substantive law to unrelated conduct taking place
elsewhere. 5 The court also distended the already controversial
passive personality link, which grants states jurisdiction over acts
against their nationals abroad,"6 by extrapolating it to justify juris-
diction, not when the victim is a U.S. national, but when his family
members are."7
The source of these doctrinal contortions is a failure properly to
transition the due process test from the interstate context under
the Fourteenth Amendment to the international context under the
Fifth Amendment. In the interstate context, a test focused on a
"contact or significant aggregation of contacts ' makes sense. It is
designed to prevent jurisdictional overreaching within the federal
system of states and to protect parties from "unfair surprise or frus-
tration of legitimate expectations" resulting from the choice of a
law they could not have anticipated would govern their conduct
when they engaged in it."9 On this latter rationale, the Supreme
Court has emphasized that "[w]hen considering fairness in this con-
text, an important element is the expectation of the parties.""45 For
"3 Id.
'Goldberg v. UBS AG, 690 F. Supp. 2d 92, 107 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
"5 It is true that the Supreme Court has considered the existence of general jurisdic-
tion as a factor that, when combined with other links, might create a sufficient nexus,
see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 317-18 (1981), but the Court immediately
qualified the use of general jurisdiction in this manner to the facts before it-
specifically, where the defendant also knew that plaintiff's decedent was an employee
in the forum and therefore could reasonably expect the application of forum law. Id.
at 318 n.24 ("There is no element of unfair surprise or frustration of legitimate expec-
tations as a result of Minnesota's choice of its law. Because Allstate was doing busi-
ness in Minnesota and was undoubtedly aware that Mr. Hague was a Minnesota em-
ployee, it had to have anticipated that Minnesota law might apply to an accident in
which Mr. Hague was involved.").
'Goldberg, 690 F. Supp. 2d at 109-10.
"
7 Id. at 95 & n.7, 110.
" Hague, 449 U.S. at 313.
"'Id. at 318 n.24.
" Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822 (1985).
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example, "The application of an otherwise acceptable rule of law
may result in unfairness to the litigants if, in engaging in the activ-
ity which is the subject of the litigation, they could not reasonably
have anticipated that their actions would later be judged by this
rule of law." ' 1 By peeling back the language of the test to reveal
these underlying state sovereignty and individual rights rationales,
it becomes apparent why an interstate test focused on contacts
does not translate identically to the international system.
In the U.S. interstate system each state has its own laws and, al-
though states may apply other states' laws, there must always be
some contact justifying application of any given state's law to any
given person or thing."2 Thus in the abstract, Texas courts may ap-
ply Texas or Nevada law to Armand's gambling. But concretely,
for Texas courts to apply Texas law, Armand's gambling must have
a constitutionally adequate contact with Texas; and for Texas
courts to apply Nevada law, Armand's conduct similarly must have
a constitutionally adequate contact with Nevada. Otherwise, appli-
cation of the law could be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair by dis-
respecting the sovereignty of the state whose law would otherwise
apply and by defeating Armand's reasonable expectations."3
In the international system, each nation also has its own laws.
But as we know, those national laws may reflect or incorporate in-
ternational law, which applies everywhere. As a result, where a na-
tion properly applies through domestic legislative and judicial ap-
paratus a universally applicable international law, there is a "false
conflict" of laws.' That nation simply applies a law that by virtue
of international law also applies within other nations and there is
no conflict of laws. Concerns about disrespecting other nations'
sovereignties dissolve because those nations have already con-
451 Hague, 449 U.S. at 327 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822
("There is no indication that when the leases involving land and royalty owners out-
side of Kansas were executed, the parties had any idea that Kansas law would con-
trol.").
412 See Hague, 449 U.S. at 312-13.
413 See Shutts, 472 U.S. at 822.
" For an elaboration of this point and its implications, see Anthony J. Colangelo,
Universal Jurisdiction as an International "False Conflict" of Laws, 30 Mich. J. Int'l L.
881, 882-85 (2009); see also Brilmayer & Norchi, supra note 1, at 1260; cf. Shutts, 472
U.S. at 816 ("There can be no injury in applying Kansas law if it is not in conflict with
that of any other jurisdiction connected to this suit.").
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sented to that international law. In addition, and as an important
aside from a U.S. perspective, it is far from clear that Fifth
Amendment due process even cares about other nations' sover-
eignty interests since that concern in the U.S. interstate test stems
not from the Due Process Clause but from the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, which regulates neither international choice of law'
nor the federal government in this context.56
We are left then with the bread and butter of due process: indi-
vidual rights, and more specifically, shielding parties from "unfair
surprise or frustration of legitimate expectations., 457 But here too
the nature of the international legal system erases the due process
objection where states properly implement international law. The
defendant cannot claim lack of notice or unfair surprise if all U.S.
law does is apply an international norm to which that individual al-
ready was subject. Moreover, international law contains jurisdic-
tional rules about which nations may apply that norm, and some of
these rules-like universal jurisdiction-require no nexus at all.'
To better conceptualize the jurisdictional dynamic when a nation
implements international law in this way, instead of analogizing to
U.S. state courts extending state laws extraterritorially, the more
apt analogy is to U.S. state courts applying a federal law to which
the defendant is subject irrespective of where the conduct took
place within the system of states.
Accordingly, if Texas has no nexus to Armand but applies its
anti-gambling law to him for gambling in Las Vegas, Armand has a
strong Fourteenth Amendment due process objection. But if the
United States applies its anti-plane bombing law to Yousef, and
that anti-plane bombing law implements an international law to
which Yousef is already subject in any state, Yousef has no Fifth
... Hague, 449 U.S. at 321 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring) (explaining that "[t]he Full
Faith and Credit Clause, of course, was inapplicable in Home Ins. Co. because the law
of a foreign nation, rather than of a sister State, was at issue").
41 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the
public Acts, Records, and Judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Con-
gress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and
Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."). The Clause does regulate the
exercise of federal power in the context of recognition of judgments. See Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980).
4" Hague, 449 U.S. at 318 n.24.
4" See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
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Amendment due process objection. Once again, shedding light on
the proper relationship between international and national law
dispels Yousef s precedential shadow. Because both plane-bombing
and financing terrorism are universal crimes (as evidenced by the
substantive and jurisdictional provisions of the widely ratified trea-
ties prohibiting them), '59 the Second Circuit did not need to find a
nexus in Yousef, and the court in Goldberg did not need to strain
the general jurisdiction or passive personality contacts to manufac-
ture a nexus in that case either. In both cases, no foreign sover-
eignty concerns or unfair surprises trigger due process precincts on
the application of federal law. And in both cases, the source of
Congress's lawmaking authority informs the due process analysis
by revealing that when Congress implements international law
through a multilateral source, a U.S. nexus may not be necessary.
At the same time, when Congress uses a unilateral source or ma-
terially deviates from international law when purporting to imple-
ment international law via a multilateral source, a nexus is needed.
First, to the extent Fifth Amendment due process cares about
other nations' sovereignties (and again, it is not clear that it does),
that concern pops back into frame with unilateral sources. Unlike
international law, other nations may not have consented to, say,
unilateral projections of U.S. securities or antitrust laws within
their territories," and absent a U.S. nexus, the choice of U.S. law
appears arbitrary. Next and more central to the due process in-
quiry, absent a nexus the defendant might have no reasonable ex-
pectation that a unilateral projection of U.S. law would apply to
her extraterritorial conduct. For instance, if instead of bombing an
airplane, Yousef had gambled in the Philippines, application of
U.S. anti-gambling law to him could be unfair and violate due
process.
The same goes for departures from international law when ap-
plying U.S. laws purporting to implement it. It is only a matter of
time before foreign defendants start making these claims in ATS
suits. As noted in Part III, the court in the South African apartheid
litigation applied uniquely federal common-law rules of corporate
... See supra notes 373-77 and accompanying text.
4'o See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004)
(questioning the propriety of applying U.S. antitrust laws when the alleged conduct
and harm occur in foreign jurisdictions).
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veil-piercing and agency to non-U.S. entities acting outside the
United States. 1 Why would a German company operating in
South Africa have any expectation that its conduct there would
someday be subject to U.S. federal common-law rules of liability?462
This would seem a clear case of "unfair surprise or frustration of
legitimate expectations"' 63 where "[t]he application of an otherwise
acceptable rule of law may result in unfairness to the litigants if, in
engaging in the activity which is the subject of the litigation, they
could not reasonably have anticipated that their actions would later
be judged by this rule of law."'
CONCLUSION
Extraterritoriality issues promise only to gain in frequency and
importance. The current, piecemeal approach to the field has pro-
duced a rambling labyrinth of analytical bloat. The law is complex
without subtlety, knotted without development, and often blunt
without judgment. Courts are confronted with an increasingly intri-
cate array of overlapping but doctrinally disconnected questions
about legislative authority, statutory construction, and due process.
And the fallout is manifest. The law offers disturbingly little pre-
dictive assurance on how any given statute will be construed on any
given set of facts not already squarely addressed by precedent. Fur-
thermore, statutes have been applied in ways that contradict legis-
lative intent, threaten failure to fulfill U.S. obligations, and may
catch defendants unfairly by surprise.
This Article has attempted to cleanly sort out the doctrinal
strands and show how they can be woven together to create a coher-
ent, workable, and attractive alternative. It unifies the extraterritori-
ality analysis by using the source of lawmaking power behind a stat-
ute to determine the appropriate canon of construction for that
statute and to evaluate whether its application violates due process.
461 See supra notes 339-42.
462 See In re S. African Apartheid Litig., 617 F. Supp. 2d 228, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(aRplying U.S. agency principles to Daimler).
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 318 n.24 (1981).
,6 Id. at 327 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U.S. 797, 822 (1985) ("When considering fairness in this context, an important ele-
ment is the expectation of the parties.").
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